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I dedicate this first chapter in a similar manner as Henry Mintzberg did in his 
1998 text, Strategy Safari: A Guided Tour through the Wilds of Strategic Management: “I 
dedicate this project to such people who are more interested in open fields than closed 
cages.” Imagination and creativity, coupled with intellectual capital, are the effective 
countermeasure for challenges to be faced by state, local, and tribal law enforcement 
agencies in their mission to counter violent extremism. 
A. BACKGROUND 
In the United States, the mission of combating violent extremism (CVE) is a 
recent challenge for all stratifications of law enforcement: federal, state, local, and tribal 
(SLT). Until 2001, CVE was not generally a part of entry-level or continuing education 
for state, local, or tribal (SLT) law enforcement personnel; however, currently, state and 
local law enforcement agencies across the country find themselves responding to these 
emerging threats. Understandably, they are searching for guidance with this new mission. 
For example, the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) indicates, 
“communities of all sizes are dealing with individuals and groups that proffer violent 
interpretations of ideologies, radicals hoping to identify and groom new recruits, and 
individuals that are radicalizing to violence” (2014, p. vii). In addition, McCants and 
Watts (2012) point out that there are several U.S. government documents on the CVE 
mission; however, none provide a consensus on what CVE is nor how those efforts are to 
be accomplished. A substantial part of the overall CVE challenge, apart from kinetic 
events, is the counter-radicalization process for those persons at risk to become terrorists. 
Counter radicalization works to provide positive, multidisciplinary, non-lethal 
intervention(s) with those at risk to becoming radicalized prior to a violent extremist act. 
The White House CVE Summit in 2015 decreed, “CVE encompasses the preventative 
aspects of counterterrorism as well as interventions to undermine the attraction of 
extremist movements and ideologies that seek to promote violence” (White House Office 
of the Press Secretary, 2015). Furthermore, three specific programs were highlighted to 
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accomplish the collective White House advocated CVE mission: 1) building  
awareness, 2) countering extremist’s narratives, and 3) emphasizing community-led 
intervention (White House Office of the Press Secretary, 2015).  
This counter-radicalization challenge is one that SLT law enforcement agencies 
can find themselves ill equipped to face, both in experience and under existing doctrine. 
For most SLT law enforcement agencies, there are just a few concrete, comprehensive 
resources to assist with or provide guidance for this task. Most all are written documents 
and do not facilitate nationwide discussion of which strategies work and which do not. 
This is a substantive focus of this paper as CVE and specific counter-radicalization 
strategies emerge.  
New and evolving Islamic terror groups threaten domestic security. In September 
2011, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) asserted, “the nature of the 
threat from international Islamic terrorist groups is likely to change” after events such as 
the Arab Spring and the death of Osama bin Laden. New terror aberrations, such as the 
Islamic State (IS), currently dominate headlines with its savagery in the Middle East, 
while groups like Al Qaeda (AQ) still pose a significant threat globally. Even though this 
country has not experienced the massive loss of life as it did during the attacks of 
September 11, 2001, it has experienced deadly events such as the Fort Hood massacre, 
the Boston Marathon bombing, workplace beheadings from radicalized individuals, as 
well as multiple foiled terror attacks over the last 14–15 years. In successful interventions 
against violent extremists in Garland, Texas (Conlon & Sgueglia, 2015) and Chattanooga, 
Tennessee (Slovin, 2015), local law enforcement officers have successfully stopped 
terrorists in the act of attacking civilians. 
In August 2011 the White House published a document entitled Empowering 
Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, a guide to assist SLT 
law enforcement agencies with the CVE mission. It was the follow-on document to the 
National Strategy for Counterterrorism (White House, 2011b). Empowering Local 
Partners (White House, 2011a) was the first document of its kind from the executive 
branch addressing violent extremism and radicalization, and it is one of the two 
documents central to this project. The other is the Strategic Implementation Plan for 
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Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, which 
was presented in December 2011 (White House). Both documents were foundational to 
what was presented in the White House CVE Summit of 2015. Subsequently, it was the 
first document from the federal executive branch that spoke to the general issues 
surrounding SLT law enforcement in CVE and counter-radicalization roles. The U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has a three-part strategy that supports the 
Empowering Local Partners document (White House, 2011a). The DHS (2015) 
Approach to Countering Violent Extremism has three broad objectives: 1) understanding 
violent extremism, 2) support local communities, and 3) support local law enforcement.  
Violent extremism is not a new threat to the United States, but it now has many 
more variables than it did previously. This research initially provides examples of Islamic 
violent extremism, as it is an immediate national threat; however, the project envisions 
application to all forms of violent extremism. Other forms of violent extremism include 
the horrific North Charleston African-American church active shooter incident that 
claimed the lives of nine people in a white supremacist, hate-filled extremist rampage by 
Dylann Roof (Sanchez & Payne, 2015). Many domestic groups can be categorized as 
violent extremists, such as domestic terrorists (e.g., Aryan Nations, New Black Panther 
Party). The CVE mission is not just limited to radical religious ideology. For example, 
DHS (2015) explains that violent extremism threats to the homeland are “neither 
constrained by international borders nor limited to any single ideology.” Local, state, and 
tribal law enforcement agencies need to be aware of many different violent extremism 
variables, such as politically driven extremism, and not just the extremism of religious 
ideologies. As the term violent extremism may refer different ideologies, this paper 
considers Islamic violent extremism as a theme; however, it is not the only dangerous 
ideology in American society.  
The initial Empowering Local Partners (White House, 2011a) is structured by 
four major parts: 1) the challenge, 2) a community-based approach, 3) goal and areas of 
priority action, and 4) guiding principles. The three substantial subheadings are within the 
Goals and Areas of Priority Action section and deal with 1) enhancing federal 
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engagement, 2) building government and law enforcement expertise, and 3) countering 
violent extremist propaganda (White House, 2011a).  
Local and state counter-radicalization efforts are the most effective strategies for 
combating Islamic violent extremism. Knowledge of the local communities and the 
relationships built upon long periods of trust are two of the most important variables to 
enhance success. In mainstream American policing, the community policing model is 
similar in its scope as it focuses on stakeholders, relationships, and shared community 
outcomes. Consider the following excerpt from the Empowering Local Partners 
document:  
The Federal Government will often be ill-suited to intervene in the niches 
of society where radicalization to violence takes place, but it can foster 
partnerships to support communities through its connections to local 
government, law enforcement, Mayor’s offices, the private sector, local 
service providers, academia, and many others who can help prevent 
violent extremism. Federal departments and agencies have begun 
expanding support to local stakeholders and practitioners who are on the 
ground and positioned to develop grassroots partnerships with the 
communities they serve. (White House, 2011a, p. 3)  
The initial Empowering Local Partners (White House, 2011a) document is short, 
eight pages in length, and does not address specific strategies to be taken by state and 
local law enforcement agencies in the CVE and/or counter-radicalization mission. In fact, 
other than very broad policy and strategy strokes (e.g., using community policing and 
anti-gang strategies), there is little that the White House document provides with respect 
to guidance or a starting point for this considerable challenge, especially counter-
radicalization efforts. Subsequent efforts by the White House CVE Summit of 2015 have 
provided some additional guidance that three major metropolitan American cities have 
developed into variably successful counter-radicalization strategies. The collective 
experiences of the three successful major metropolitan police agencies will be of 
considerable value to other SLT LE agencies across the nation as we consider the 
numerous examples of American citizens participating in terror operations by violent 
activities or by substantial monetary or logistical support. For example, these actors work 
with ISIS, AQ, Hezbollah, and Al Shabbab with respect to actual and verbalized threats. 
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Examples include the Garland, Texas active shooter event from individuals inspired by 
the IS (Conlon & Sgurglia, 2015), the 9/11 attacks by Al Qaeda in New York City and 
the Pentagon, the attack on the Saudi Arabian U.S. envoy by Hezbollah, and recent calls 
from Al Shabbab to attack malls in the United States (Karimi, Fantz, & Shoichet, 2015). 
Many radicalized individuals travel overseas to act for their cause, and some aim 
to return to the United States to participate in violent acts. Other radicalized individuals 
stay within the country to perpetuate attacks through their own violent radicalization 
process via the internet or cohorts, such as the IS calls for attacking U.S. military 
members (Fantz, 2015). Federal law enforcement and the Intelligence Community (IC) 
have done a very good job of tracking those known actors across the country and 
overseas. However, in order to mitigate the threat, state and local law enforcement must 
become adept at countering radicalization and violent extremism before it occurs in the 
United States to ensure national security. It is the state, local, and tribal assets that have 
the preexisting relationships and community engagement to assist federal law 
enforcement and IC efforts as called for by the White House Summit on CVE in 2015. 
Brett Lovegrove, the incident commander of the London Underground bombings of July 
7, 2005, would call this preventative concept “getting to the left of boom” (B. Lovegrove, 
personal communication, November 9, 2011).  
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
There is very little guidance and/or substantive resource or direction for SLT law 
enforcement agencies relative to the CVE mission, especially with respect to counter-
radicalization methodology. Furthermore, there is no venue for dialogue/debate, 
information sharing, or collaboration by these same law enforcement agencies related to 
the CVE mission as to what strategies work, do not work, and why. Subsequently, there 
are no venues for SLT law enforcement collaborative efforts to test alternative ideas and 
related countermeasures and then share those experiences among SLT law enforcement 
agencies across the country. 
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C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND SUB QUESTIONS 
The main research question is can the creation of a learning organization for state 
and local law enforcement enhance the mission and provide problem-solving strategies 
for combating Islamic violent extremism in the United States? The sub questions are:  
1. What model may be proposed as a proof of concept for the law 
enforcement learning organization?  
2. Can asynchronous discourse via computer-based internet discussion 
boards facilitate the combating violent extremism mission for state and 
local law enforcement agencies?  
3. How might the concepts of strategic thinking and scenario planning be 
integrated into a law enforcement learning organization dedicated to 
combating violent extremism? 
4. What collaborative methods might best be used to facilitate information 
sharing within the learning organization? 
5. Can an introductory four-hour and 40-hour in-service program dedicated 
to counter radicalization and comparative methods utilizing strategic 
thinking/scenario planning, be of measurable value to state and local law 
enforcement agencies in the combating violent extremism mission? 
6. What are the ancillary benefits from a state and local law enforcement 
learning organization dedicated to counter-radicalization? 
For this research endeavor, it is very important to remember that this is the first 
such learning organization/collaboration strategy (CVE and counter radicalization) for 
SLT law enforcement agencies developed to augment the two White House monographs, 
Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States (2011a) 
and the Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent 
Violent Extremism in the United States (2011c). Revisions of this proposed learning 
organization/collaborative strategy are expected as the nature and locus of threats to the 
United States emerge and change. 
D. LEARNING ORGANIZATION PROJECT PROPOSAL 
This proof of concept project creates a computer-mediated communication 
(CMC) learning organization and curriculum development of two courses for SLT law 
enforcement for the purpose of CVE, specifically to address counter-radicalization 
methods and efforts. The project will augment the emerging practice of counter 
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radicalization for SLT law enforcement agencies in the United States and provide a 
forum for discussion, sharing ideas, and providing resources. The curriculum 
development piece is an example of resources that could be provided to the participants 
to further their knowledge and understanding to CVE. The platform for the learning 
organization will be a computer-based system, similar in appearance and construction to 
the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School’s University and Agency Partnership Initiative 
(UAPI). There are two primary institutions that this learning organization could originate 
from, the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Homeland Defense and Security 
(CHDS) and/or the U.S. Army War College’s Center for Strategic Leadership and 
Development (CSLD), specifically within the Homeland Defense and Security Issues 
Group. Having both institutions partner together would be the optimal for the 
development of the proposed learning organization. The learning organization would be 
restricted to those persons involved in SLT law enforcement, fusion center, homeland 
security, and/or national security positions that work in the CVE or closely-related 
missions. Later on, invitation to broader academic institutions and resources will be 
considered. 
Initially, the CMC learning organization CVE efforts focus upon Islamic violent 
extremism and counter radicalization. However, provision of resources and guidance 
concerning domestic terror groups, their methods, and countermeasures are envisioned as 
a goal of this learning organization project at a later date and as the threats develop. A 
soft systems methodology/action research method will engage the proof of concept 
project with the counter-radicalization challenge faced by SLT law enforcement agencies. 
The goal is to present a learning organization that addresses all forms of radicalization, 
not just Islamic radicalization. To do so would go against the ideals of the learning 
organization.  
The three main goals of this endeavor will be to:  
1. Create CVE and counter-radicalization-related dialogue among SLT law 
enforcement, bureaus of investigation, intelligence fusion centers, and 
homeland security offices;  
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2. Promote collaboration between personnel tasked to preventing violent 
extremism and counter-radicalization for their particular agency and to the 
learning organization as a whole; and  
3. Provide resources such as: mission-specific online asynchronous 
discussion boards, examples of comparative counter-radicalization 
methods from other countries, curriculum development of counter-
radicalization-related law enforcement in-service courses, and relevant 
academic monographs.  
The end goal of this project is to create a learning organization to provide ideas and 
resources to self-directed law enforcement work teams at the SLT level.  
This project proposes to include state-level law enforcement agencies (e.g., state 
police/highway patrol/bureaus of investigation), state office of homeland security, and 
intelligence fusion centers for the first phase of the project. In outreach to federal law 
enforcement partners, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the IC will be a 
vital starting point for this proposed project. Additionally, the inclusion of the U.S. 
military as a partner will be an important step as it is reasonable to assume that there will 
be state and law enforcement personnel with military experience, reserve/national guard 
status, and/or substantive military-related network contacts. Experientially, military 
participants will be valuable to the overall learning organization effort. Subsequent 
phases would certainly reach out to and include tribal, larger municipal, and county law 
enforcement agencies.  
In the first phase, the agencies selected will be each of the individual state law 
enforcement agencies (e.g., state patrols and their specific bureaus of investigation), state 
offices of homeland security, as well as to the 73 intelligence fusion centers nationwide. 
Approximately 150 agencies will be invited to participate in the initial phase of 
operations. The second phase will incorporate the 200 most populous municipalities and 
counties by state. This will include city police, metro police, and county sheriff’s offices 
across the country. As the learning organization development allows, agencies 
representing the lesser populated areas of the United States will be admitted to the 
organization. Those lesser populated agencies will need to provide some proof of 
involvement in the overall CVE mission to justify participation in the learning 
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organization. Those cases will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis and the need to 
expand the CVE mission footprint may become exigent.  
The literature review for this project focuses upon four strategies that are integral 
to this proof of concept project. These strategies are: learning organizations, strategic 
thinking, scenario planning, computer mediated communication, and online 
asynchronous discussion. Much of the learning organization ideas were garnered from the 
work of Peter Senge (1999, 2006) and his application of the concept for corporations. The 
strategic thinking modality was founded on the work of Henry Mintzberg (1994, 1998) 
and has not yet been applied to the law enforcement environment. The starting point for 
scenario planning and this project began with the work of Thomas Chermack (2011).  
The soft systems methodology (SSM) was the logical choice of methodologies for 
the proof of concept project as it allows the learning organization to engage the 
challenges of CVE. Checkland and Poulter (2006) provide a short definition of SSM: 
[SSM is] an organized, flexible process for dealing with situations which 
someone sees as problematical, situations which call for action to be taken 
to improve them, to make them more acceptable, less full of tensions and 
unanswered questions. The ‘process’ referred to is an organized process of 
thinking your way to taking sensible ‘action to improve’ the situation; and, 
finally, it is a process based on a particular body of ideas, namely systems 
ideas. (p. 4)  
Contributions from academia (including critical collaborative efforts with law 
enforcement) will be useful in the counter-radicalization effort and facilitate the overall 
CVE learning organization’s partnership focus as the process matures. It is expected that 
higher education institutions across the United States will continue to produce studies 
with many different research methodologies concerning terrorism and conflict. As the 
national and international academic contributions regarding counter-radicalization 
methodology continue, American law enforcement will reap the benefits of the literature. 
Counter-radicalization strategies based upon sound research theory and pragmatic 
application will find their way to law enforcement via entry level and continuing 
education venues. With that said, presenting international comparative counter-
radicalization methods to the CVE learning organization participants via law enforcement 
 10 
continuing education programs, commonly referred to as “in-service programs,” would 
lend to more robust countermeasures for state and local enforcement.  
A research consortium or related group will be initiated by the learning 
organization’s facilitators and participants after the CMC process creates new knowledge 
and the participants produce ideas and written deliverables. Sharing those ideas and 
written deliverables within the learning organization community will allow for greater 
dialogue within the context of the LE CVE mission. Basic research methodology courses 
will be created for those interested within the learning organization. The National Fire 
Academy Executive Fire Officer Program applied research pre-course is an example of 
this strategy.  
With consideration for measuring CVE mission outcomes, the federal government 
advises the local partners to define and develop their own preventing violent extremism 
programs (specifically to address counter radicalization). However, local and state 
partners require resources to assist in developing these critical programs. A starting point 
for this project would be a communication and collaborative space. More on this 
particular task will be presented in Chapter IV.  
Lastly, in order for the agencies and participants to share ideas and experiences, 
especially failures, the organization will need to cultivate a culture of trust. The ability to 
learn quickly from failures and mistakes will be an important component for the overall 
success of the law enforcement learning organization. The ability to “fail faster” and 
revise counter-radicalization methods will assist state, local, and tribal law enforcement 
officials and their stakeholders in keeping up in a dynamic, ever-changing environment.  
The CVE environment demands a nimble, creative process to produce effective 
countermeasures. The ability to know when countermeasures are ineffective or wrong 
and make the appropriate course corrections will be critical in this environment. Breaches 
of trust such as criticism of an agency’s policy/procedures and/or releasing confidential 
or classified information within the learning organization will be handled in a strict and 
straightforward manner and will not be tolerated.  
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The next three subsections will address online asynchronous discussion (OAD), 
facilitation, and curriculum, development, all of which are integral parts of the law 
enforcement learning organization concept.  
1. Online Asynchronous Discussions 
The most valuable product of this project will be the productive discussions by 
the state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies that participate in the learning 
organization. The ability of these agencies to dialogue, debate, analyze, and engage ideas 
is be the primary operative objective of the project. The proposal presented in this study 
will advocate an online asynchronous discussion (OAD) format facilitated by interested 
scholars and practitioners through the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and the 
U.S. Army War College. Through the data collection over time, further inquiries via 
research endeavors will be identified.  
Consider Beckett’s point about the use of computer-mediated communication 
(CMC) and the justifications for its use:  
Computer-mediated communication (CMC) and online instruction have 
become integral parts of higher education, particularly in Australia, 
Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The justifications for 
these forms of instruction include budget cuts, performance-based 
budgeting, and demands for flexible instructional delivery as well as a 
belief that technology-integrated discussion can promote higher-level 
thinking and improved writing skills. One technology-integrated 
instructional model is online asynchronous discussion (OAD), a 
communication tool used extensively to support student interaction and 
engagement. (Beckett, 2010, p. 315)  
In addition to the interactions by the participants and the resultant professional 
development benefits, the proposed organization will facility “academic discourse 
socialization” as described by Feger and Zibit (2005). This idea is related to social 
identity theory as introduced at NPS by Brannan and Strindberg (2012). The participants 
will exhibit their own sense of belonging as they interact with other group members and 
develop measurable progress and problem-solving skills. This idea will be explored more 
later in Chapter I. 
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When the facilitators of the law enforcement learning organization identify and 
recruit stakeholders for the program. For example, the National Fusion Center 
Association (NFCA) and the International Chiefs of Police (IACP) will be specifically 
targeted for marketing and advocacy. The IACP (2014) monograph on Using Community 
Policing to Counter Violent Extremism: 5 Key Principles for Law Enforcement will be 
highlighted as guidance for the SLT LE community. Additionally, the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s Center for Homeland and Security already conducts marketing for 
its Master of Arts program in security studies with a concentration in homeland defense 
and security, its Fusion Center Leaders Program (FCLP), and its Executive Leaders 
Program (ELP). There may be a chance that both the SLT learning organization and 
CHDS may be able to market each other’s programs. CHDS is a proposed a stakeholder, 
and it could possibly include information about the program in its existing marketing 
material. In addition, the U.S. Army War College will have the ability to guide students 
through research endeavors related to defense support for civil authorities as well as 
advertise for one- to two-year teaching opportunities for scholars through the 
Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA).  
2. Facilitation 
The facilitators of the learning organization will provide frameworks for 
collaboration and teaming concepts to better enhance sharing of information. The 
learning organization will use video conferencing, online lectures, podcasts, and related 
live audio-visual components to engage and keep participants interested. In addition, 
those the learning components will be archived for future participant use and reference. 
All information will be reviewed and revised as time and resources allow by all 
participants of the law enforcement learning organization, including facilitators. Having a 
historical record of the learning organization’s efforts to as related to CVE, especially 
within concerning the counter radicalization, will be of considerable academic and 
professional value. One of the planned goals of the organization is social science-based 
research. Lastly, the participants themselves will be polled as to what resources and 
materials could be provided to them and how that information could be best provided. In 
addition to small inputs from the facilitators themselves, regular feedback mechanisms 
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will be introduced so that the agencies themselves help guide the overall direction of the 
learning organization.  
What might be the role of the facilitators in the law enforcement learning 
organization? This is a good question, and it has not been answered within the CVE 
context. The course facilitators will require skill sets that assist in the development of the 
participant’s analytical skills when needed. To be certain, the facilitator’s role in the 
learning organization is not to teach but rather to assist in providing information and 
guiding discussions. The participants themselves will engage in topics that they find 
challenging within the CVE environment. Sharing knowledge and expertise within the 
context of their own experiences will be of substantial value. 
3. Curriculum Development 
Developing two courses related to the CVE/counter-radicalization mission will 
augment the CMC/OAD learning organization strategies. The first course to be developed 
will be four hours in length, entitled Introduction to Strategic Thinking and Scenario 
Planning for Law Enforcement CVE Missions. The course will present strategic thinking 
and scenario planning alternative strategies to SLT law enforcement agencies as they 
meet the challenge of CVE. Moreover, this course will be created with an online delivery 
option. Participants will view the four hours of instruction, take a short summative 
written examination, and be cleared for subsequent courses. Furthermore, taking this 
course will be a prerequisite for an eligible candidate to join the learning organization or 
the first course after acceptance. Additionally, the course will be submitted to each state’s 
specific peace officer standards and training commission to be evaluated for continuing 
education credit to assist with certification maintenance requirements for state, local, and 
tribal law enforcement personnel who participate in the law enforcement learning 
organization. The second course, Domestic and International Comparative Counter-
radicalization Methods for Law Enforcement CVE Missions, will be elective and created 
for those law enforcement learning organization participants who wish to gain continuing 
law enforcement credit, and this will be better defined shortly. 
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The first course will be approximately four to five hours in length and delivered 
via an internet educational portal. Students will be able to log in and view the 
instructional materials and interact with the course at their convenience. In addition, the 
students will be able to stop at certain points and save their progress if needed as some 
students may not have the time to dedicate the time to complete the internet instruction at 
one sitting for various reasons. For example, some departments will not be able to release 
an officer for training as workload may not allow. Additionally, many agencies do not 
have the funds to allow officers to attend extra training. Subsequently, the facilitators 
responsible for curriculum development will apply to each state’s version of a peace 
officer’s standards and training commission for five hours of continuing law enforcement 
educational credit.  
The general outline for this course is presented below and is subject to revision 
based upon student and agency feedback and evaluation of current needs. The course 
facilitators will gather course evaluation data via a mixed methods survey instrument 
immediately after the course and three to six months afterward to gain an idea of efficacy 
and value.  
As this internet-based course is foundational in its scope, the students will be 
provided with the basic tools to progress to the 40-hour in-service on Domestic and 
International Comparative Counter-radicalization Methods for Law Enforcement CVE 
Missions. The overall goal of this 45 hours of education will be to provide an alternative 
method for creating countermeasures to the CVE mission, specifically counter 
radicalization. The educational module is not meant to be compulsory, rather it is meant 
to be an augmentation to the CMC discussions. 
The first day of the second course will be spent facilitating dialogue among the 
students as well as providing essential materials for the course (e.g., readings, PowerPoint 
presentations). The class will be presented with the most current challenges of counter-
radicalization in the United States and abroad. Discussion of current events and case 
studies will facilitate this portion. Additionally, an overview of social identity theory will 
be presented as a framework for understanding the radicalization process. The latter part 
of the day will introduce the student practitioners to the basic tenets of Islam and its 
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unique situation of radicalization and extremism (similar to the online lecture series, The 
Global Jihadi Threat, created by Dr. Nadav Morag at the Naval Postgraduate School). 
The theme for the day will be to encourage student analysis of the wicked problem of 
counter radicalization and violent extremism and how they might continue creating 
effective counter measures.  
The second day will include a discussion of current overall U.S. counter-
radicalization strategies and examples of state/local methods. Prior to the course, the 
student practitioners will have prepared a five to seven minute PowerPoint presentation 
of their jurisdiction’s counter-radicalization strategy. One of the mandates of their 
presentation will be to have them introduce any innovative counter-radicalization 
method(s) that may not be used elsewhere in the United States. Considerable value will 
be placed upon the student practitioners providing examples of what has and has not 
worked for their jurisdiction. A safe environment, devoid of blame, will allow the student 
practitioners to be candid with assessments, which is critical for this course (a similar 
construct to “Chatham House rules”). Toward the end of the day, an introduction to 
comparative methods will prepare the student practitioners for their next two days of 
class.  
The third and fourth days will explore two international comparative counter-
radicalization methods in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. The initial phase of 
instruction for both methods will involve explanation of the structure of government for 
both countries. This discussion will lead to the students beginning to analyze methods of 
different governmental structures. The bulk of the day will provide examples of counter-
radicalization strategies and examples for each country. Additionally, small group work 
will allow the student practitioners to apply their analyses to the comparative methods 
and reason through strategy applications with their new knowledge. Furthermore, special 
attention will be made to possible state and local applications of the comparative 
strategies and what barriers, limitations, and/or unrealistic scenarios might be for those 
strategies.  
The last day will allow the students to employ what they have learned and apply 
their analysis to three problem-based scenarios. Each one of the scenarios includes a role 
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play situation and a specific vignette. A practice scenario, which may be graded, will be 
presented to the entire group prior to engaging those scenarios. Grades will be assigned 
by the instructional cadre along with feedback from the students on each other’s 
contributions to the problem solving and/or strategy/policy exercise. Each exercise is 
expected to last approximately 60–75 minutes. Some scenarios may have several 
iterations in that time for the student practitioners to work through. When possible, case 
studies will be selected from actual counter-radicalizations situations from around the 
world. There will be a debriefing at the end of the day to allow for feedback for the 
student practitioners, the instructional cadre, and the role players that facilitated the 
scenarios. Lastly, a follow-on tutorial for developing rubrics to measure outcomes of the 
local counter-radicalization efforts of the student practitioners will be advocated and 
made available after the course completion. A discussion board will be created within the 
learning organization to foster discussion/discourse on the strategic thinking/scenario 
planning methods. The facilitators will conduct a qualitative assessment of strategic 
methods through content analysis of discussion board themes. The analysis would 
provide content themes that facilitators and/or academic participants could use to follow 
critical topics. 
This learning organization project also proposes creating a continuing education 
curriculum to provide participants with a foundational course that presents international 
comparative methods of counter-radicalization policies and strategies. This effort for the 
prevention of violent extremism is similar to the strategies found in the White House’s 
Empowering Local Partners document (2011a). Additionally, the reason for the inclusion 
of fusion centers with state law enforcement entities is fusion centers’ unique mission of 
intelligence analysis and dissemination. This collaboration will be synergistic as fusion 
centers, with their mission centered on information sharing, intelligence, and 
dissemination, will provide a different perspective than that of SLT law enforcement 
agencies. As CVE and counter-radicalization resources continue to grow, sharing 
information will help to ameliorate common problems. 
State and local law enforcement personnel will benefit from international 
comparative counter-radicalization training. No state law enforcement agency, bureau of 
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investigation, homeland security office, or fusion center currently offers a comparative 
method counter-radicalization course to personnel who are tasked with this mission. 
Also, any curriculum development process in this area would assist in addressing the 
shortcomings of the Empowering Local Partners document (White House, 2011a). 
Additionally, a course in this specific subject area would provide needed background and 
assist law enforcement in creating more comprehensive, localized counter-radicalization 
strategies. State law enforcement assets were selected for the law enforcement learning 
organization as they have direct links to specialized enforcement, resources, and have an 
established network with smaller county and municipal partner agencies. This course may 
be used for the partner agencies at a later date when best practices have been proven and 
a learning organization established for counter radicalization.  
This second of the two courses will be a 40-hour in-service course entitled, 
Domestic and International Comparative Counter-radicalization Methods for Law 
Enforcement CVE Missions. The prerequisite for this course will be the first course, four-
hour strategic thinking/scenario planning course. In the beginning, this second course will 
be a traditional classroom course that mobile training teams will deliver across the 
country. The learning organization facilitators and/or their appointees will provide on-
ground training to state and local law enforcement agencies. Through this process, not 
only will the course include CVE and counter-radicalization materials but the foundation 
of the course will include strategic thinking and scenario planning. In addition, this 
course will synergize with the CMC-related materials. As the course is delivered across 
the country and continually revised to meet the needs of the participants, the course 
length may shorten or lengthen, depending upon what the data leads the learning 
organization to do. The ability of the students to understand, synthesize, and make 
applications of counter-radicalization strategies for their own jurisdiction will be the 
major outcome for the course.  
With respect to the length of the proposed courses, a balance must be maintained 
between time to provide critical material to the law enforcement personnel and time away 
from their critical duties. Creating a focus group of subject matter experts will provide an 
avenue for discourse to forge curriculum goals and objectives, search the existing 
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research and practice literature, evaluate and incorporate material, create audio-visual or 
internet instructional content, and create an evaluation system that encourages critical 
feedback. The evaluative system will be significant as the unconventional threats from 
Islamic terrorism are dynamic and have many different participating groups (e.g., the 
Islamic State Boko Haram, Hezbollah, Hamas, Al Shabbab, Al Qaeda and its many 
affiliates) and tactics. Changes to the course are expected, and we need to be able to 
create effective countermeasures with a quick turn-around time. Measuring the efficacy 
of the learning organization and its curriculum will be as important to the development of 
content.  
For both courses, the law enforcement learning organization’s facilitators will 
provide a course curriculum application to each state’s version of their peace officer 
standards and training commission. The reason for this application process is to allow 
each state’s peace officer and training standard’s commission to review and approve the 
curriculum to count for their particular state’s continuing education requirements. This 
application will provide curriculum evidence to SLT law enforcement continuing 
education decision makers to allow law enforcement officers to have tangible continuing 
education credit for their attendance and successful completion. The courses are 
explained in detail in Chapter IV and also presented in in detail the appendix sections of 
the project. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without 
strategy is the noise before defeat.  
—Sun Tzu 
A. INTRODUCTION 
For this project, the literature review is a critical analysis of the extant literature 
and seeks to explain the four separate subject areas into the concept of a law enforcement 
learning organization. These subject areas are: 1) online asynchronous discussion (OAD), 
2) strategic thinking, 3) scenario planning, and 4) collaboration. A major component of 
the proposed SLT enforcement learning organization will be asynchronous discussion 
boards, similar to what are found in undergraduate and graduate-level internet-based 
courses.  
The two White House CVE documents from mid-to late 2011, Empowering Local 
Partners and Strategic Implementation Plan, have brought SLT law enforcement 
agencies a substantial challenge for creating strategies for CVE, specifically concerning 
counter radicalization. Consider these same documents in light of Mintzberg’s (1998) 
discussion of the idea of “disjointed incrementalism” as an illustration of an emerging 
learning model by Charles Lindblom (1968) in his textbook entitled, The Policy-Making 
Process. According to Mintzburg:  
He described policy making (the label in government) as a ‘serial,’ 
‘remedial’ and ‘fragmented’ process, in which decisions are made at the 
margin, more to solve problems than to exploit opportunities, with little 
regard for ultimate goals or even for connections between different 
decisions. Lindblom argued that many actors get involved in the process, 
but they are hardly coordinated (2614) by any central authority. ‘Various 
aspects of public policy and even various aspects of any one problem or 
problem area are analyzed at various points in time with no apparent 
coordination’ he wrote (p. 105). At best, the different actors engage in an 
informal process of ‘mutual adjustment.’ (Mintzberg, 1998, Kindle 
locations 2617–2625)  
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The current administration’s strategies for the CVE mission, especially in the area 
of counter radicalization, could be considered as disjointed and disorganized with little 
regard to direction or measurements for success. Lindblom’s (1968) explanation of the 
involvement of “many actors” who are “are hardly coordinated” could well explain some 
of the consternations faced today by the overall homeland security enterprise, not just 
what state and local law enforcement agencies are facing in the CVE mission. In this 
case, disjointed incrementalism is a learning model that needs to be avoided. It is 
necessary to engage in healthy discussion and discover resultant effective 
countermeasures to combat the complex CVE threat.  
The Empowering Local Partners document brought forward critical reviews from 
many different venues (White House, 2011a). For example, Ed Husain, the Senior Fellow 
for Middle Eastern Studies from the Council on Foreign Relations, summed up the White 
House document when he wrote, “Homegrown radicalization of Americans precedes 9/
11, but it has taken the U.S. government over ten years to produce a document aimed at 
preventing ‘violent extremism in the United States’ and yet it says worryingly little” 
(2011). 
Nearly 15 years have passed since the tragic events of September 11, 2001. Even 
with multiple examples of radicalized violent extremist events over that period, the threat 
of radicalization leading to violent extremist acts has not been taken seriously. This fact 
was not lost on Husain when he explicated:  
But the modus operandi of the White House’s new policy paper, it seems, 
is not to offend Muslims. Consequently, the document falls short of 
outlining a robust, credible, and confidence-inspiring plan. The strategy 
avoids the vital issues of defining the threat, the ideas behind al-Qaeda, 
where extremism festers, and how the government plans practical 
responses to it. The paper relatedly states the obvious about federal 
responsibilities of ‘convening’ and ‘strengthening stakeholders,’ and 
suggests little new. And while the paper claims to work with ‘local 
communities’ (read Muslims), it disregards the common complaints from 
U.S. Muslim communities about the FBI’s entrapment of their radicalized 
youth—a practice that should be replaced by de-radicalization programs or 
dialogue under surveillance (as is the practice in Europe). (Husain, 2011)  
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The Council on Foreign Relations is not the only group to provide criticism of the 
White House document and its strategies. Muslim advocacy organizations, the American 
Civil Liberties Union, various U.S. Congress members, and non-governmental agencies 
have also expressed their misgivings about the document. For instance, Sullivan (2011) 
stated that U.S. lawmakers felt that the Obama administration’s strategy “is short on 
details and fails to name a single point of coordination for all of the various initiatives at 
the federal and local levels.” Coordination, or at least some form of clearinghouse of 
information, will be critical for this process. Additionally, SLT law enforcement agencies 
will need to share information as the process is developed. No such venue exists for SLT 
law enforcements agencies at this time.   
As a reaction to the multiple criticisms of the Empowering Local Partners 
document, the White House produced a follow-on document in December 2011, entitled 
Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent 
Extremism in the United States. This document was also criticized as its main focus 
seemed to protect First Amendment rights. It is apparent that no specific, creative 
strategies for combating violent extremism or specific counter-radicalization techniques 
existed in these early documents; rather, it appears that there was a scramble in place to 
place this mission into pre-existing community policing programs (Temple-Ralston, 
2011). Even though the documents addressed the issue of partners and organizers, there 
was no direction for the selection or development for those people (Bjelopera, 2011). 
Aziz (2011) takes issue with the Strategic Implementation Plan document by criticizing:  
despite the White House’s seemingly benign approach to counterterrorism, 
its implementation produces adverse effects similar to Representative 
Peter King’s confrontational tactics’ referring to the congressional 
hearings on homegrown terrorism. Aziz is in agreement, stating, ‘If the 
government is serious about partnering with Muslim communities, it must 
stop behaving like an adversary. For starters, community outreach 
programs should not be exploited to spy on Muslims, recruit undercover 
informants, and fake false promises.  
It is readily apparent that pro-security and pro-Muslim organizations alike have 
been quite critical of the Empowering Local Partners as well as Strategic Implementation 
Plan documents, albeit for different reasons. Analyses of the critiques from both 
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perspectives indicate both initial White House documents fall well short in the area of 
strategy. At this point, SLT law enforcement agencies have little in the way of guidance 
and direction in the CVE and counter-radicalization missions apart from the recent IACP 
(2014) and White House CVE Summit (2015) documents. However, there are strategies 
that have arisen that may prove to be foundational in these missions. For example, in 
2014, the International Association of Chiefs of Police created a document entitled, Using 
Community Policing to Counter Violent Extremism: 5 Key Principles for Law 
Enforcement (IACP, 2014). This document is limited to a community policing model for 
the CVE mission, but it does address some of the broad suggestions from the 
Empowering Local Partners document (White House, 2011a). The five key principles 
included in the document are:  
1. Foster and enhance trusting partnerships in the community 
2. Engage all residents to address public safety matters 
3. Leverage public and private stakeholders 
4. Utilize all partnerships to counter violent extremism 
5. Train all members of the department (IACP, 2014, pp. vii–viii). 
The last key principle is of interest as it suggests that all members of a department 
be trained in the IACP-recommended modality. The IACP states, “training should be up 
to date and unbiased, stress the differences between countering violent extremism and 
counterterrorism, and be mandatory for all members of the department” (2014, p. viii). 
This point is one of the first recommendations for selection and development of SLT law 
enforcement personnel as described by Bjelopera (2011). Caution should be practiced in 
training all law enforcement members in the collective CVE mission. Some SLT LE 
members may require an “awareness-level” of training, while a core group of personnel 
are trained to perform the mission for the agency.  
During a policy forum address for the Washington Institute, Matthew Levitt 
(2010) spoke to the issue of two already implemented counter-radicalization strategies. 
He stated:  
Two fundamental strategies for disrupting the radicalization process have 
already been implemented to some degree: integrating immigrant 
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communities and supporting alternatives to extremist ideologies. 
Integration builds resiliency by minimizing the local grievances and 
alienation that radicalizers typically use as a point of entry to introduce 
their violent worldview. U.S. efforts on this front have generally been 
successful, in part due to America’s inclusive, immigrant-friendly 
environment, aggressive anti-discrimination legislation, and strong belief 
in equal opportunity.  
In the same presentation at the Washington Institute, Levitt (2010) provides a 
solid exemplar for the creation of the SLT LE learning organization with respect to 
understanding the CVE environment when he speaks to the issue of “community 
engagement” below: 
Contesting violent extremism also requires countering the radical Islamist 
narrative. This does not mean banning despicable, but protected speech; 
rather, it means openly contesting extremist views by offering alternatives 
and fostering deeper ideological debate. The objective in either case is to 
strengthen the moderate center against the extremist pole and help Muslim 
communities become more resilient in confronting the challenge. 
Community engagement and “hard” counterterrorism are key elements of 
this comprehensive strategy, but in the wide space between them, counter-
radicalization efforts must be emphasized. (Levitt & Carpenter, 2010)  
Levitt and Carpenter (2010) addressed a Policy Forum luncheon at the 
Washington Institute. Carpenter indicated his thoughts on strategy for the CVE mission 
prior to both White House documents when he described:  
In developing its strategy to counter radicalization, the Obama 
administration should emphasize that radical Islamist theology is the key 
driver of the violence espoused by al-Qaeda and its cohorts. At a 
minimum, this development should be done internally to provide 
bureaucratic clarity and improve intradepartmental and interagency 
coordination on these issues. Such a move would strengthen a whole-of-
government approach and better align budgets and programs with 
declarative policy. (Levitt & Carpenter, 2010) 
In developing this project as a proof of concept, the ideas of both Leavitt and Carpenter 
will be synthesized to solve the problem faced by state and local law enforcement 
partners.  
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The soft systems methodology (SSM) was the logical choice of methodologies for 
the proof of concept project as it allows the learning organization to engage the 
challenges of CVE. Checkland and Poulter (2006) provide a short definition of SSM: 
[SSM is] an organized, flexible process for dealing with situations which 
someone sees as problematical, situations which call for action to be taken 
to improve them, to make them more acceptable, less full of tensions and 
unanswered questions. The ‘process’ referred to is an organized process of 
thinking your way to taking sensible ‘action to improve’ the situation; and, 
finally, it is a process based on a particular body of ideas, namely systems 
ideas. (p. 4) 
Checkland and Poulter summarized this research method in a manner that 
provides a preview of why the state and local law enforcement learning organization 
utilized it. They explain:  
In summary, then, we have 
• a problematical real-world situation seen as calling for action to improve 
it; 
• models of purposeful activity relevant to this situation; 
• a process of using the models as devices to explore the situation; and 
• a structured debate about desirable and feasible change. (Checkland & 
Poulter, 2006, p. 11) 
The CVE and counter-radicalization mission is the real-word situation calling for 
action to improve it, as the authors Checkland and Poulter (2006) indicate. The learning 
organization model will be the purposeful activity relevant to the situation and used to 
explore it. The product of discussion/discourse through the online asynchronous 
discussion forums will assist in the debate about desirable and feasible change. More will 
be explained on the SSM process in Chapter III.  
B. LEARNING ORGANIZATIONS 
The starting point for the learning organization is with the work of Chris Argyris 
(1991) and Peter Senge (1999, 2006), who are considered by many to be the subject 
matter experts of this particular concept. The type of learning organization that Senge 
(2006) describes is foundational to the proof of concept that this research seeks to create 
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for the law enforcement learning organization. In order to bring the idea to fruition, the 
mission of the learning organization must be well defined; it should facilitate healthy and 
productive discussion/discourse on the subject matter, as well as maintain momentum 
once the project is started. Not having a clear direction for the law enforcement learning 
organization would kill the project before it gets started.  
The primary mission of the law enforcement learning organization will be to 
create a resource for information and secure site for sharing information on combating 
violent extremism, especially counter-radicalization efforts, at the SLT levels. As time 
passes, a repository of information will be created, archived, and available for analysis 
for practitioners and scholars with permission to access. 
It will be up to the participants and facilities to maintain momentum once the 
organization is up and running; it will be a shared approach. CVE is a dynamic 
environment with many political and psycho-social variables and constructs to consider. 
If the participants choose to utilize the learning organization to change focus and 
direction as threats change, the learning organization could be of tremendous value. The 
ability of the organization to “recycle” itself will enhance its ability to survive and remain 
useful. 
There are several foundations upon which the law enforcement learning 
organization will be built: online asynchronous discussion, strategic thinking, scenario 
planning, and collaboration. As the learning environment and participants allow, these 
four concepts will be woven into the overall construct of the learning organization. After 
the initial start-up of the project, it is envisioned that weaving in the foundations will be 
one of the facilitator’s major operational roles, almost as important as facilitating 
discourse itself.  
Alarid (1999) presents two key theoretical fundamentals contributed by Chris 
Argyris, whose main research focus was organizational learning and organizational 
behavior:  
Argyris (1973, 1974) specified two theoretical assumptions of personality 
and organizational theory. The first assumption was that organizations 
have a life of their own. Organizations exist because goals become too 
 26 
complex for one individual to achieve. Large traditional organizations are 
inflexible in supporting individual change and growth and encourage 
dependence, apathy, and compliance. 
A second assumption was that individual traits, abilities, and needs exist 
on a continuum rather than in a vacuum. This means that individuals are 
complex and have changing needs requiring appropriate organizational 
responses to fulfill individual maturational perspectives. These two 
assumptions also fit the community policing philosophy, which assumes 
not only that the individual worker has changing needs inside the 
organization, but that the outside community in which the officer serves 
has unique problems and developments. (p. 324) 
As Alarid’s research focuses upon law enforcement learning organizations and 
community policing, his project was of particular interest with respect to the proposed 
law enforcement CVE learning organization (1999). Both White House documents 
Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States (2011a) 
and the Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent 
Violent Extremism in the United States (2011c) speak to utilizing pre-existing community 
policing models to assist in counter radicalization. Argyris’s work deals with 
organizational change, which will be paramount that the facilitators of the organizational 
course. SLT LE organizations will need to quickly identify internal and external 
organizational barriers and remove or significantly mitigate them. Argyris’s description 
of “traditional organizations are inflexible in supporting individual change and growth 
and encourage dependence, apathy, and compliance” is what the law enforcement 
learning organization seeks to avoid (Argyris, 1999).  
On the subject of law enforcement and learning organizations, Alarid (1999) 
believes:  
To create a learning organization in criminal justice, particularly in law 
enforcement departments, it is important to explore the theoretical 
underpinnings of human relations theory tied to organizational learning. In 
law enforcement administration, the human relations perspective focused 
on individual needs within the organization, a preference for an informal 
style of organizational interaction, and a concern for motivating factors to 
improve productivity in the workplace. (p. 322)  
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Alarid’s contentions have been considered for the law enforcement learning organization 
project. Participants and their agency’s command staff responsible for CVE planning and 
operations will be polled regularly on their particular needs as related to the CVE 
mission, especially with regard to counter-radicalization efforts. With the data from those 
needs assessments, the facilitators will focus their efforts on meeting those needs via 
CMC. As information sharing continues between participants, facilitators can steer 
information or discussion groups toward information deemed critical or important to the 
agencies’ missions. An informal asynchronous communication process will be the day-
to-day norm, with the exception of webinars, phone communications, video-
conferencing, or the like. The motivation for the participants in the learning organization 
will be a collective/collaborative effort to create effective CVE strategies. 
Collective stress scan be a significant variable with groups, especially those that 
deal with exigent situations, as the law enforcement learning organization may 
experience. Reason indicates:  
Stress shared within a group can create reactions that may have long-term 
implications for its progress. Some psychologists believe that groups as 
large as an entire nation can share stress and may experience post-
traumatic stress after a difficult national or international event. (Reason, 
2010, Kindle location 1006).  
Terrorism events perpetrated by Islamic extremist actors are expected in the 
future, and law enforcement agencies across the country will be pressured to demonstrate 
what they are doing to combat the threat. Additionally, those personnel involved in the 
CVE mission will experience their own stressors as they are expected to perform and 
produce results when these attacks occur. The collective efforts of the participants in the 
learning organization will be a problem-solving resource and possible an outlet for the 
stressors during or after these chaotic events. Subsequently, the creation of the in-service 
modules on strategic thinking and scenario planning as well as comparative methods 
should assist these agencies in their problem-solving strategies and decrease the stress by 
providing effective ideas for countermeasures.  
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C. ONLINE ASYNCHRONOUS DISCUSSION AND COMPUTER-
MEDIATED COMMUNICATION 
One of the starting points for the proposed SLT law enforcement learning 
organization will be computer mediated communication (CMC) through dedicated 
discussion boards. These are also known as online asynchronous discussions (OAD). The 
first subject area for an OAD proposed for this project is counter radicalization. There are 
few studies dedicated to facilitating online discourse, and none deal with issues related to 
homeland security. The majority seem to deal with higher education venues. Beckett 
(2010) investigated the use of OAD and asynchronous discussions for academic 
discourse socialization. In his review of the literature, the following points on CMC and 
OAD are well taken. He writes: 
Computer-mediated communication (CMC) and online instruction have 
become integral parts of higher education (Jones, Johnson-Yale, 
Millermaier, & Perez, 2008; Lin, 2008; Mason, 1989). The justifications 
for these forms of instruction include budget cuts, performance-based 
budgeting, and demands for flexible instructional delivery (Harris, 1998). 
(Beckett, 2010, p. 315) 
As law enforcement agencies face budget cuts, forced layoff of personnel, and 
inadequate staffing, they will have to do more with less. The quest to find alternative 
methods for effective policing will become more persistent as financial resources become 
scarcer. The public will demand the same or better service out of law enforcement, 
regardless of agencies’ budgetary woes, and the CVE mission will be no different. 
Departmental counter-radicalization efforts will inevitably have priorities placed ahead 
them, such as day-to-day routine operations and fuel. 
The benefits of CMC and OAD methods is well explained in Beckett’s article as 
the five following demonstrate:  
Technology-integrated instruction can promote higher-level thinking and 
improved writing skills (Lin, 2008). OADs are seen as forums where shy 
and reticent students can voice their opinions without the anxiety they 
often experience in face-to-face discussion due to linguistic and cultural 
differences (Yildiz & Bichelmeyer, 2003). 
OADs can facilitate academic discourse (Warschauer, 1997). OADs can 
facilitate professional socialization and community building (Lord & 
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Lomicka, 2004). OADs facilitate thoughtful and extended engagement at 
students’ convenience (Henri, 1992; Thomas, 2002). (Beckett, 2010, pp. 
315–316)  
The proposed learning organization strategy utilizing OAD methods will entail 
sharing information on what works and what does not work with respect to certain parts 
of the CVE mission. For example, sharing information on counter-radicalization efforts 
will be the first OAD-related task of the learning organization and its facilitators. 
Learning will occur through sharing information and inquiry between the law 
enforcement learning organization participant to agency. Facilitators will provide 
guidance and/or resources when requested or an opportune time is presented. The 
facilitators will poll participants (and agencies) periodically to find out what their 
particular needs are in their given CVE mission. The CVE environment is dynamic, and 
the resources required today may not be the same as what may be needed six months to a 
year from now. OAD may provide a dynamic, responsive vehicle to the ever-changing 
CVE environment. 
The facilitators of the learning organization will emphasize a safe environment for 
sharing information with the OAD venue. There must be an environment of trust within 
the learning organization. This will take time, but the end result could yield information 
that will allow the organization to fail faster and learn quicker from CVE 
countermeasures that do not work. Imagine a participating organization sharing a CVE 
countermeasure or counter-radicalization modality that did not work. Sharing that type of 
information will be immensely valuable as other agencies will react to the information 
and implement other countermeasures as necessary. 
Internal dialogue/discussion will be the most common events within the learning 
organization. The transaction of discourse and sharing information are critical to the 
health of the learning organization. There may be some effort by the facilitators to bring 
about positive discussion amongst the participants. Encouraging and facilitating an 
environment that values discussion of failures as much as successes will be critical to the 
learning organization. Facilitation does not mean “micro-management;” however, it 
would be prudent for the facilitators to be prepared to make minor adjustments to the 
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discussion boards when needed. The Eberly Center at Carnegie Mellon University’s 
Eberly Center for Teaching Excellence and Educational Innovation explains:  
Discussions can be an excellent strategy for enhancing student motivation, 
fostering intellectual agility, and encouraging democratic habits. They 
create opportunities for students to practice and sharpen a number of 
skills, including the ability to articulate and defend positions, consider 
different points of view, and enlist and evaluate evidence. (Carnegie 
Mellon University, n.d.)  
The facilitator’s role will be to optimize the counter-radicalization discussion by having 
participants’ defend their positions and strategies in their discussions when needed. It is 
noted that other participants will be challenging assumptions and providing feedback as 
well.  
D. STRATEGIC THINKING 
For this section, we must ask, why is strategy important? Werner (2010) provides 
a cogent explanation in his textbook describing scenario analysis when he provides an 
explanation that augments the argument for including strategic thinking as a tenet for the 
SLT law enforcement learning organization as: 
A strategy can clarify the purpose of the organization. Vision statements, 
mission and goals are meant to sound good, inspire, and give a general 
definition of what an organization seeks to be.’ Additionally, ‘this is what 
we are, this is our business, and this is how we propose to go about it. This 
is the course of action we must take, the pattern of decisions that must be 
made to get to the desired future destination. (Werner, 2010, Kindle 
location 664)  
The business of the SLT law enforcement learning organization is to discuss, create, and 
provide viable, rational, and successful counter-radicalization strategies across the United 
States. The desired future destination is decreasing radicalized violent extremism. 
The purpose of the SLT law enforcement organization is clear. The organization 
will seek to cultivate discussion, share information, and create an environment to foster 
problem-solving strategies for the CVE mission, specifically counter-radicalization 
efforts. As Werner (2010) explained above, “this is how the organization’s purpose 
translates into things that must be done” (Kindle location 664). As a strategy for our 
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learning organization, we want to make sure that our participants know there is the “logic 
and purpose” to our program. Providing exemplars of proven state and local CVE 
programs will be a good place to start, especially if those exemplars are a result of the 
collective discourse of the learning organization. 
What is strategic thinking? How will it apply to the state and local law 
enforcement learning organization? The Center for Applied Research (2001) provides a 
solid definition: “Strategic thinking focuses on finding and developing unique 
opportunities to create value by enabling a provocative and creative dialogue among 
people who can affect a company’s direction.” The idea of the center’s description 
previously will enable the SLT law enforcement agencies to engage in “provocative and 
creative dialogue,” as noted above, to assist in the counter-radicalization challenge. 
Strategic thinking will be the overall theme of the state and local law enforcement 
learning organization project. Even though the roots of strategic thinking are within the 
corporate business world construct and outlined by the strategist Sun Tzu, its application 
and worth cannot be ignored for law enforcement. One of the two curriculum 
development endeavors for the project will involve an introduction to strategic thinking 
to foster its use, especially within the OAD venue. It is expected that encouraging the use 
of strategic thinking during subject-related discourse will provide unique problem solving 
strategies. The strategic thinking and scenario planning continuing education is meant to 
augment the OAD. It can be taken as a before entering into the CMC or utilized to better 
understand the machinations of the learning organization. If this approach is not feasible, 
then having the course as a resource (e.g., setting it up through a massive open online 
course and/or a learning management system) would be of considerable value to the 
students. The law enforcement learning organization will utilize an applied form of 
strategic thinking, specifically to the CVE mission of counter-radicalization.  
In case of the state and local law enforcement learning organization, the 
benchmark organizations are violent Islamic extremist groups. The 12 questions Stowall 
(2008) brings forth should be revisited frequently by all of the facilitators and participants 
alike. The premise that “everyone in the organization has to be a contributor, not just a 
performer” is emphasized in a manner that is inclusive, not exclusive, in its application.  
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Each law enforcement agency and each member of that agency’s CVE team that 
participates in the learning organization will have input. Not only will participants reflect 
on their contributions to the overall organization, they should reflect and revise their own 
contributions to their local, tribal, or state jurisdiction, constantly reinforcing and 
reevaluating their own mission effectiveness. Such an evaluative component is critical in 
the success of the project. Steven Stowall, from his 2006 text, entitled Ahead of the 
Curve: A Guide to Applied Strategic Thinking, adds, “the organization’s success is 
dependent on each individual’s ability to contribute to the whole and become more 
valuable to the organization and society” (Kindle location 118) This idea lends to 
Stowall’s contention that “organizations want people who can act” and “think, look 
ahead,” and “anticipate change” (Kindle location 118). It is his thought that “every 
employee an entrepreneur” (Stowall, 2008, Kindle location 118). Furthermore, Stowall 
also provides for what he calls “bottom-up strategy” as individual contributors, not just 
managers, can provide direction for strategy. This concept is important for the law 
enforcement learning organization as the individual participants in the OAD on counter 
radicalization, as they share ideas, can collectively drive an effective counter-
radicalization strategy or build upon or validate those strategies that work. 
The situation that Stowall (2006) describes would be the optimal outcome for the 
law enforcement learning organization; it is a reasonable goal to seek to achieve. Turning 
each law enforcement participant into a strategist is a motivation factor itself. This 
“bottom-up” strategy allows for a greater number of ideas to flow into the organization 
for consideration. To have all participants invest in their work will be a focal point for the 
facilitators and should be reinforced often.  
There are seven specific steps, in two distinct phases, in the strategic thinking 
process as explained by the Harvard Business School (2010). Phase 1 is described as 
“setting the stage” and consists of 1) seeing the big picture, and, 2) articulating strategic 
objectives” (Harvard Business School, 2010, Kindle location 93). The law enforcement 
learning organization’s facilitators will understand and articulate the learning 
organization’s mission within the counter-radicalization construct, explaining the current 
and future radicalization threats to the country as well as discussing and soliciting for 
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those strategies that are effective in this mission while guaranteeing civil liberties and 
public trust. Phase 2 is described as “applying your skills.” It has five specific steps 
consisting of 1) identifying relationships, patterns, and trends, 2) getting creative, 3) 
analyzing information, 4) prioritizing your actions, and 5) making trade-offs (Harvard 
Business School, 2010, Kindle location 93). The five steps in Phase 2 good starting 
points for the facilitators with respect to doctrine within the learning organization. 
The goal of the in-service training is to assist in building strategic thinking skill 
set, which in turn synergizes scenario planning efforts. Encouraging creativity, new 
alternatives, and the ability to keep one’s mind open for other possibilities is one that is 
typically not encouraged in the paramilitary environment of law enforcement. The 
strategy will attempt to encourage creative and asymmetrical thinking.  
Pietersen (2002) speaks to a related issue he terms strategic learning. His ideas are 
of value as they speak to the issue of renewal, which is a valuable outcome for the 
learning organization. He posits, “To succeed, companies must generate insights, create 
focus, achieve alignment, and motivate change continuously, in a dynamic cycle of 
renewal. This cycle is the essence of Strategic Learning” (Pietersen, 2002, Kindle 
location 700).  
Pietersen’s idea of thinking “cycle, not straight line” is a process that will prove 
itself to be quite valuable for the organization as a whole (2002). The dynamics of CVE 
and the counter-radicalization process are dynamic ones, not static ones. If the law 
enforcement learning organization does not account for a changing environment, its 
collection of strategies from shared dialogue will not keep up with the threat. It is not yet 
known if the facilitators will introduce this idea or if the idea will generate itself through 
our learning organization’s own work.  
E. SCENARIO PLANNING 
Chermack (2011) provided his idea of “turbulent fields,” which can be correlated 
with the violent extremism and radicalization. He suggests, “few would disagree that 
most contemporary organizations are heavily steeped in turbulent fields. Turbulent fields 
are worlds in which dynamic processes create significant variance” (Chermack, 2011, 
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Kindle location 380). Additionally, this idea of turbulent fields fits with the idea of the 
law enforcement learning organization being able to adapt as Pietersen (2002) suggests. 
Few would disagree that the counter-radicalization mission environment would qualify as 
a turbulent field by Chermack’s definition.  
The United States Army War College (USAWC) provides another exemplar of 
the complex environment of counter radicalization and violent extremism. Chermack 
(2011) provides the USAWC with the concept of volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and 
ambiguity (VUCA) (Kindle location 388). Considering the challenges that SLT law 
enforcement has with the counter-radicalization mission in the United States, coupled 
with the recent Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 9/11 review commission report 
(2015), indicate that the inadequate FBI budget does not lend itself to the “social and 
prevention role in the CVE mission” (Hoffman, 2015, p. 112). SLT law enforcement 
agencies find themselves in the VUCA environment.  
The learning organization would learn from the VUCA idea facilitated by the U.S. 
Army War College. The ability to address volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and 
ambiguity within the CVE environment as a day-to-day objective of the learning 
objective would be a tremendously appreciated skill for the participants and their 
stakeholders. Discussion and analysis of concepts and ideas in the complex and chaotic 
environment of combating violent extremism fits well here. 
Scenario planning is a concept that should be brought forward to the learning 
organization soon after a reasonable tempo of dialogue and information sharing is 
achieved. Examples of counter-radicalization scenario planning could be brought to the 
group for their analysis and critique. Fine tuning these scenarios and the collective 
group’s use of scenario planning and experience could be used as model exemplars for 
future use and revision. In addition, archiving those scenarios and the dialogue created by 
those scenarios could provide valuable insight for social science research. Creating 
conversation and debate within the learning organization is the goal of the scenario 
strategy. Chermack explains he has learned that “the community of practitioners building 
learning organizations that learning faster than competitors is the ultimate competitive 
advantage” (2011, Kindle location 109). The scenario planning exercise would augment 
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the ability of the practitioners to understand the environment and provide a manner in 
which to learn faster and gain an advantage.  
There are four major outcome categories of scenario planning per Chermack 
(2011): “1) changed thinking, 2) informed narratives or stories about possible or plausible 
futures, 3) improved decision-making about the future, and 4) enhanced human and 
organization learning and imagination” (Kindle location 559). Chermack’s contentions 
will enhance the creation of problem-solving strategies as time goes on and participants 
communicate and collaborate with each other. It is hypothesized that that the CMC 
venue, the use of OAD, and the two in-service courses will synergize and realize his four 
major outcome categories.  
Additionally, the SLT law enforcement learning organization needs to address 
performance-based scenario planning as one of the methods/strategies for the SLT law 
enforcement learning organization. This specific issue is also addressed in the limitations 
section in Chapter V. It is of critical importance that limitations of the proof of concept 
are addressed prior to implementation of the learning organization and the CMC. 
Performance-based scenario planning “includes an outcome of performance 
improvement” (Chermack, 2011, Kindle location 559). Initially, facilitators can create 
metrics to evaluate the SLT law enforcement learning organization. As the learning 
organization evolves, feedback loops from the participants can assist with revising 
metrics and evaluative methods in order to improve organizational efficacy.  
Groups bringing forward successful and creative scenario planning concepts and 
strategy would be invited to a central area and realistic scenarios could be both developed 
and worked through; a think tank of scenario planning in the CVE mission could be a real 
outcome of the learning organization. This is related to a substantial vision of the 
USAWC and its efforts within homeland defense and security. During a commander’s 
all-call on September 29, 2014, Commandant William E. Rapp indicated that the future 
focused mission will be the “think-tank” for strategic thinking for the United States Army 
(personal communication). Additionally, part of that presentation included an expanded 
role for the homeland defense and security mission. As the Islamic State of Iraq and 
Levant threat appears to expand, this mission may become critical as many radicalized 
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Islamists, as well as other international and domestic extremist groups, focus their hatred 
of the United States. The current terrorism activity level of IS in Europe (e.g., Belgium, 
France, Turkey) should be an indicator of things to come or to be planned for in the 
United States. State, local, and tribal law enforcement countermeasures to this threat will 




Strategy is the great work of the organization. In situations of life or death, 
it is the Tao of survival or extinction. Its study cannot be neglected.  
—R. M. Grant, Contemporary Strategy Analysis 
A. BACKGROUND 
An action research/soft systems methodology was selected for this proof of 
concept project as it addresses a current problem and allows the practitioner to enter into 
a problem-solving construct. Stringer explains the methodology as:  
Action research is a systematic approach to investigation that enables 
people to find effective solutions to problems they confront in their 
everyday lives. Unlike traditional experimental/scientific research that 
looks for generalizable explanations that might be applied to all contexts, 
action research focuses on specific situations and localized solutions. 
(2007, p. 1)  
The concept of using a law enforcement learning organization to address specific 
challenges to Islamic violent extremism via investigational methods and focus on 
solutions at the local level fits the spirit of the White House 2011 documents pertaining to 
empowering local partners, as the process is interagency and information sharing for best 
practice.  
Soft systems methodology (SSM) is a form of action research that provides a 
process that fits this learning organization project. The four-step method aligns itself to 
the problem-solving actions that the learning organization will bring to SLT law 
enforcement. The methodology provides a four-step cyclical model as described by 
Checkland and Poulter (2006): 
1. Finding out about the initial situation that is seen as problematical. 
2. Making some purposeful activity models judged to be relevant to the 
situation. Build each model as an intellectual device on the basis of a 
particular worldview. 
3. Using the models to question the real situation. This brings structure to a 
discussion about the situation, the aim of which is to find changes that are 
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both arguably desirable and also culturally feasible in this particular 
situation. 
4. Define/take the action to improve the situation. Since the learning cycle is 
in principle never ending, it is an arbitrary distinction as to whether the 
end of a study is taken to be defining the action or actually carrying it out. 
Some studies will be ended after defining the action, some after 
implementing it. (pp. 13–14)  
As the four steps by Checkland and Poulter (2006) are considered, the SLT law 
enforcement learning organization’s development framework is evident. First, the 
problematical situation that needs to be addressed is the issue of radicalized individuals 
committing violent extremist acts within the United States. Local, state, and tribal law 
enforcement agencies will be increasingly tasked with the mission of addressing this and 
related issues. Currently, there are limited resources to address the counter-radicalization 
mission, but even so law enforcement is engaging with it. For instance, pilot programs for 
LE CVE missions and examples of other counter-radicalization efforts are found in major 
metropolitan cities such as Boston, Los Angeles, and Minneapolis-St. Paul. Second, the 
purposeful activity of the participants in the learning organization will allow for 
augmentation of emerging counter-radicalization strategies within a resource and 
discussion forum dedicated to sharing information about the mission. The information 
could include departmental strategies, barriers to implementation, unforeseen challenges, 
mistakes within practice, etc. Third, the learning organization will be the model by which 
to investigate the situation. It can provide ground truth to debunk policy and practitioner 
myths as well as to provide validation in the complex environment of counter 
radicalization. Lastly, the learning organization will aid national counter-radicalization 
activities by providing a clearinghouse forum for discussion of which strategies work and 
which do not, and it can provide resources to agencies that are or active in the counter-
radicalization mission (e.g., training activities through curriculum development within the 
learning organization) or actively creating a counter-radicalization mission. 
For the purpose of the proposed SLT law enforcement learning organization, the 
problematical situation that needs investigation would be the lack of direction, resources, 
and strategies provided to SLT law enforcement agencies by the federal government for 
the CVE mission, especially with regard to counter radicalization. It is well documented 
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that there is little guidance provided from the federal government for this mission. 
Furthermore, SLT law enforcement agencies have little/no experience in this mission and 
require resources to assist them with creating successful countermeasures. Subsequently, 
it is expected that some STL law enforcement organizations may not know what they 
need with respect to skill sets in the CVE and the counter-radicalization mission; 
however, the proposed learning organization affords them the opportunity to better 
understand the environment.  
The purposeful activity model proposed is a learning organization that utilizes 
CMC and OAD methods, webinars, and curriculum development of courses related to the 
CVE mission for participating agencies. It is through these methods that we will explore 
effective CVE and counter-radicalization methods assigned to SLT law enforcement 
agencies. CMC and OAD models are well-developed intellectual models within the 
higher education environment and will similarly serve the learning organization. In 
addition, OAD discourse also facilitates writing and critical thinking skills (Lin, 2008). 
These abilities will translate into valuable skill sets for SLT LE personnel to use in the 
CVE mission. The initial method to assist in questioning and improving the problematic 
situation presented to the SLT law enforcement concerning the CVE mission, especially 
in the area of counter radicalization, will be CMC mediated discourse via an OAD 
computer. As the problem is hypothesized as a never-ending problem, a never-ending 
thread of discourse is envisioned to assist in combating the threat. Additionally, the 
webinars and two proposed CVE-related courses will assist and synergize the CMC and 
OAD methods employed by the learning organization.  
Addressing the challenges provided by the CVE mission, particularly counter 
radicalization, to SLT law enforcement agencies will be the primary mission of the 
proposed learning organization. This process is a cycle, one that is continually revising 
the learning activity. Moreover, the CMC and OAD methods facilitate the cyclical model 
as described by Checkland and Poulter (2006). Herr (2005) reinforces the definition of 
action research and provides a salient example of why this method is employed in this 
particular project as well the basis of the intellectual framework to be utilized by it. He 
posits, “action research is best done in collaboration with others who have a stake in the 
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problem under investigation” (Herr, 2005, p. 3). It is obvious that the SLT law 
enforcement agencies across the country have a stake in the problem they are attempting 
to ameliorate.  
B. STUDY DESIGN, LEARNING ORGANIZATION, AND RELATED 
COURSE DEVELOPMENT 
This study will employ the SLT law enforcement learning organization to address 
the overall challenge of the complex environment of counter radicalization and the 
emerging doctrine to fulfill this mission by SLT law enforcement agencies. This is 
posited as a purposeful activity model and intellectual device to solve problems and 
facilitate productive discussions and effective countermeasures related to the CVE 
mission.  
For this section, there will be two different evaluative methods. One is to compare 
pre- and post-SLT participant readiness with respect to the CVE mission. The second 
method will evaluate the two courses developed for the learning organization for 
applicability to the mission and efficacy within the mission. The curriculum evaluation 
section will provide information as to what needs to be changed to better align the 
courses with effective and valid countermeasures. These sets of developed survey 
instruments are created as descriptive methods, as the instrumentation attempts to 
describe the current status of the CVE mission, especially counter radicalization by SLT 
LE agencies.  
A mixed methods (quantitative and qualitative) instrument will evaluate the 
baseline as to what SLT law enforcement agencies require to be effective in the CVE 
mission, especially with regard to counter-radicalization methods. The baseline measures 
will dictate future CMC and OAD methods as well as the inquiry into related materials to 
assist in the CVE mission.  
After the learning organization comes into operation, it is imperative to measure 
the CMC and OAD venues for effectiveness as well as to evaluate the two courses 
(Introduction to Strategic Thinking and Scenario Planning for Law Enforcement CVE 
Missions and Domestic and International Comparative Counter-radicalization Methods 
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for Law Enforcement CVE Missions). The evaluation will be a two-phase method that 
will consider the initial implementation as well as the incorporation of the two courses 
developed to augment the project. The survey instrumentation for this section will use 
mixed methods research and will provide information as to efficacy toward the CVE 
mission. This task would be completed after approval of the project and implementation 
of the curricula.  
For the two proposed courses, it is important for course facilitators to know if the 
participants view them as important and effective in the CVE mission. This course is not 
taught in any SLT law enforcement continuing education or even as an entry-level course 
for law enforcement elsewhere, and it must be must be evaluated with that fact in mind. 
The outline for the Introduction to Strategic Thinking and Scenario Planning for Law 
Enforcement CVE Missions course can be found in Appendix A. The outline for the 
Domestic and International Comparative Counter-radicalization Methods for Law 
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IV. PROPOSED MODEL 
The future often acts like a drunken monkey stung by a bee—it is 
confused and disturbing, and its behavior is completely unpredictable.  
— T. J. Chermack, Scenario Planning in Organizations:  
How to Create, Use, and Assess Scenarios  
A. THE LEARNING ORGANIZATION: STRATEGIES AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS  
This thesis proposes several recommendations for the overall learning strategies 
of the proposed learning organization. The first recommendation is to establish an overall 
strategy and purpose for the state law enforcement learning organization endeavor. There 
are proven strategies that have been presented to organizations that will assist with the 
task. For example, Senge (1999) offers seven strategies to meet the challenge of strategy 
and purpose:  
1. Use scenario thinking to investigate blind spots and signals of unexpected 
events. 
2. Combine scenario thinking and explorations of organizational purpose. 
3. Develop stewardship as an organizational ethic and practice. 
4. Engage people continually around organizational strategy and purpose 
(explain the internet forum idea). 
5. Expose and test the assumptions behind the current strategy. 
6. Focus on developing better strategic thinking and ethical thinking 
capabilities. 
7. Learn to pay attention to subtle shifts in the sense of possibility. (pp. 496–
503)  
Senge’s strategies can assist the learning organization to develop its mission and 
vision statements. State, local, and tribal law enforcement personnel should engage 
counter-radicalization issues ethically as a central tenant to this effort. The development 
by law enforcement of better strategic thinking methods will be key. The second idea this 
thesis recommends for the law enforcement learning organization is to foster and nurture 
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an environment of creativity and imagination within the learning organization 
community. This should be expected of the organization from the beginning. 
Senge (1999) describes learning:  
The basic meaning of a learning organization—an organization that is 
continually expanding its capacity to create its future. For such an 
organization, it is not merely to survive. “Survival learning” or what is 
more often termed “adaptive learning” is important—indeed it is 
necessary. But for a learning organization, “adaptive learning” must be 
joined by “generative learning,” learning that enhances our ability to 
create. (p. 14)  
Creativity and the ability to adapt will be essential components of the counter-
radicalization effort. If the radical adversaries are creative, the personnel tasked to 
provide countermeasures should be as well. One of the goals for the project is to create 
healthy and effective SLT law enforcement dialogue on the counter-radicalization 
mission. This will be a challenge, as Crowley (2012) points out:  
In America, we tend to overlook the “presence of strife, envy, faction” in 
our daily intercourse. “Argument” has a negative valence in ordinary 
conversation, as when people say “I don’t want to argue with you,” as 
though to argue generates discord rather than resolution. In times of crisis, 
Americans are expected to accept national policy without demur. (Kindle 
location 80) 
Recommendation three is for the learning organization is to create the access 
rights and infrastructure for the state law enforcement learning organization. It is 
necessary for the organization to have a secure website with screened access as the venue 
in which to present information to law enforcement agencies. Andresen (2009) asserts 
there are two distinct OAD mechanisms he has found to be very important in an 
asynchronous OAD forum “the role of the instructor and achieving deeper/higher 
learning” (p. 250). It will be important for the LE CVE learning organization to be aware 
of these two mechanisms. With respect to the role of the instructor, Andresen (2009) 
contends, “the instructors felt that the virtual classroom, including the asynchronous 
discussion forum became more intimate” and “instructors found that their teaching 
involved deeper cognitive complexity (cognitive role)” (p. 250). Thus, having a secure 
website would facilitate both of these instructor (facilitator) roles to some degree. With 
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respect to achieving deeper/higher learning, Andresen (2009) referred to the work of Zhu 
(2006). Zhu (2006) “has found that high levels of interconnectedness between learners 
leading to higher levels of knowledge construction must be explicitly built into the 
discussion assignment and nurtured by the instructor” (p. 252). The SLT LE learning 
organization facilitators will need to be selected for not only their knowledge base; they 
must also be competent in fostering discussion. 
The majority of communications for the learning organization are expected to be 
at the unclassified for official use only (U/FOUO) and law enforcement sensitive (LES) 
classifications. Facilitated discussion among those who are performing and/or planning 
for the counter-radicalization mission is critical in the process of participant learning. Part 
of creating infrastructure for the learning organization is the creation of discussion boards 
for personnel to share information and ask questions of fellow agencies across the 
country so as to identify best practices for preventing violent extremism. These 
discussion boards will be a staple of the organization. Additionally, participants and 
facilitators will be able to post up-to-date news, links, and information related specifically 
to counter radicalization and prevention violent extremism as new information is 
gathered and processed. 
The fourth recommendation this thesis has for the learning organization is to 
gather baseline data from the SLT learning organization participants as to what their 
current counter-radicalization efforts are, what works well, and what does not work. This 
endeavor would compile data as to what strategies and policies, if any, SLT law 
enforcement agencies, intelligence fusion centers, and state homeland security offices are 
currently using. Additionally, having the baseline data will allow the organization to 
follow trends and accelerate the learning curve and mitigate mistakes in the counter-
radicalization mission. Furthermore, the exploration and analysis of successful multi-
disciplinary models employed by the SLT law enforcement agencies and other 
organizations (e.g., fire service, emergency medical services, the healthcare community 
at-large, Muslim clerics, and Muslim community leaders) will be of substantive value to 
the organization at large. 
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In addition to these recommendations, the learning organization will need to seek 
funding streams and best budgetary practices for the endeavor. These issues will be 
important to explore as future financial forecasts for state and local government continue 
to be grim. Staffing and personnel issues should be part of the consideration as well. 
B. ENHANCING COLLABORATION THROUGH STRATEGIC PLANNING 
AND SCENARIO PLANNING  
This thesis officers several recommendations to the learning organization to 
enhance collaboration along the lines of strategic thinking and scenario planning. The 
first is that the learning organization should seek federal law enforcement and military 
partnerships from the start. SLT partners may be seen as “clusters” of working groups for 
bringing new ideas and information to federal and military agencies as a value-added 
component of this organization. 
The second recommendation for collaboration is to consider partnering with the 
state, municipal, and county-level agencies and plan for measured growth without loss of 
communication efficacy. In addition, it is reasonable to predict that the initial 
collaboration effort will be limited to law enforcement and ancillary personnel; however, 
the value of other relevant professions should not be excluded in the long-term planning 
of the consortium. Academia, social work professionals, healthcare professions, and the 
like could contribute to the body of knowledge and provide valuable advocacy for the 
mission. The inclusion of these individuals should not be at the cost of the organization’s 
mission; rather, their inclusion should be in a collaborative, creative spirit. 
The third recommendation to facilitate collaboration is to create a “safe” 
environment for sharing information within the learning organization. It will be as 
important to learn what works as much as what does in the counter-radicalization 
mission. We recommend that promotion of a “blameless” environment to allow the states 
to share what has not worked—similar to the firefighter near-miss program or the critical 
incident stress debriefing program. To create the type of learning environment, we have 
to allow for and accept mistakes. We need what Kofman (1995) calls for, the creation of 
“safe-failing” spaces within the organizational culture. The ability to discuss problems, 
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barriers, and overt mistakes in the nation’s counter-radicalization effort is paramount to 
achieving the learning organization’s objectives. As part of the fostering an open and safe 
collaboration environment, it would be good to establish a rewards system.  
The fourth recommendation we have is for the learning organization to make 
certain the learning organization earns and keeps the public’s trust. Covey (2006) 
explains, “a 2005 Harris poll revealed that only 22% of those surveyed tend to trust the 
media, only 8% trust political parties, only 27% trust the government, and only 12% trust 
big companies” (p. 11). The learning organization endeavor will have significant 
implications for public trust, even though the exact efforts of the organization will be 
largely unknown to a large segment of the population. Knowing that the general public 
has little trust in governmental organizations should motivate the organization and the 
agencies participating to not only meet the counter-radicalization mission, but to do so in 
a manner that conveys transparency, fairness, and a sound ethical foundation. There must 
be consistent efforts on the part of the learning organization to establish trust within and 
outside the organization. Any breach of trust should be deal with swiftly to preserve the 
good of the organization and its stakeholders.  
The fifth recommendation to enhance collaboration is for the learning 
organization to encourage state and local participants to create smaller “self-directed 
work teams” for meeting the local mission. A goal of the learning organization should be 
to encourage and advocate the idea of SLT law enforcement to stand up self-directed 
work teams to work on the counter-radicalization efforts for their jurisdiction. Orsburn 
(2000) explains, “a self-directed work team is a highly trained group of employees, from 
six (6) to eighteen (18), on average, fully responsible for turning out a well-defined 
segment of finished work” (p. 5). The work of these local teams should be shared with 
the learning organization. Taking into consideration labor and related human resources 
budgetary restraints, SLT law enforcement teams assigned to the counter radicalization 
should number six to 18 personnel per team as in Orsburn’s model (2000). However, 
smaller agencies may be able to do with less.  
The sixth recommendation for collaboration is that the learning organization 
develop an internal and external stakeholder skill set to survive in a traditional 
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bureaucratic environment. Developing political savvy and diplomacy to work with 
internal and external stakeholders will assist in ameliorating bureaucratic processes that 
may impede CVE efforts. 
Providing a positive, interpersonal communication process with external 
stakeholders will be critical to achieving the counter-radicalization learning organization 
mission. Bratton (2012) notes, “keeping your supporters happy with the pace and 
direction of the collaboration is key” (p. 239). In the case of the counter-radicalization 
mission, this means providing critical information and intelligence when needed or 
requested by governing officials. The facilitators of the learning organization must be 
available to answer questions and provide guidance for strategy, policy, and evaluation 
for stakeholders and/or oversight organizations. Feedback loops between the learning 
organization and stakeholders must be evaluated frequently.  
A seventh recommendation concerns the learning organizations group dynamic 
and the proper assignment of roles within the organization. Bolman (1997) explains:  
In small groups, as in large organizations, the fit between the individual 
and the larger system is a central human resource concern. A group’s role 
system is critical. The right set of task roles helps get the work done and 
makes optimal use of each member’s resources. (p. 153)  
These informal roles, as described by Bolman (1997), will be best utilized as peer review 
roles and/or roles that target the individual’s specific personal interests, apart from their 
contributions to the group, in counter radicalization. Additionally, as SLT law 
enforcement agencies become engaged in the learning organization, the selection process 
for personnel engagement in the mission will be a critical component. Selecting law 
enforcement personnel who have the skill set to understand the substantive complexities 
and be proponents for the counter-radicalization mission, as well as to value and 
appreciate the level of commitment to perform the mission, will be key to the learning 
organization’s success.  
The eighth recommendation toward building collaboration is the reinforcement of 
the individual participants’ value and worth to the overall counter-radicalization mission, 
and individuals’ to the contributions to the learning organization should not be 
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minimized. They should be encouraged, perhaps even through the use of a rewards 
system as previously mentioned. The individual’s worth and value to the SLT learning 
organization will build because of the collaborative nature of the OAD and CMC 
environment. The issue of “contagiousness” is correlated with the exceptional threat of 
radicalization and violent extremism in all forms to the United States and the collective 
“contagious” desire to contain the threat by SLT law enforcement agencies. With respect 
to “little cause can have big effects,” one can reflect upon the mayhem, carnage, and 
havoc that one or two radicalized individuals can have in the United States. Examples 
include the Fort Hood active shooter Nidal Hassan, the Tsnarnev brothers in Boston, 
McVey in Oklahoma City, or Dylann Hood in Charleston, South Carolina. The SLT law 
enforcement learning organization will strive for the occasions to address in which 
counter-radicalization strategies can make differences and keep people safer in our 
country. Those individuals and teams who provide rational and effective strategies will 
be promoted by the learning organization facilitators after careful evaluation and shown 
as best practitioners to the entire learning organization.  
C. EVALUATION METHODS 
This section explains evaluative methods for learning organization as well as 
salient cautions in the feedback process that are worth heeding. Objective, rational, and 
measurable feedback loops will provide the SLT LE learning organization with the valid 
data needed for positive growth and efficacy of the organization.  
1. Evaluative Methods and Feedback  
This section is comprehensive as the success of the curriculum project may hinge 
upon the ability of the curriculum to 1) serve as a catalyst to guide to counter-
radicalization policy and/or strategy development and 2) be dynamic and adapt to the 
changing threat that the adversary might employ or the change in the adversary identity. 
The curriculum may be kept relevant and valid by utilizing strategic thinking instead of 
strategic planning as outlined by Mintzberg (1994). A static curriculum will not survive 
the imagination of the extremist threat.  
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Strategic planning may be too static a method for the foundation of this 
curriculum. Morrison (1994) points out:  
Strategic planning is about analysis (i.e., breaking down a goal into steps, 
designing how the steps may be implemented, and estimating the 
anticipated consequences of each step). Strategic thinking is about 
synthesis, about using intuition and creativity to formulate an integrated 
perspective, a vision, of where the organization should be heading.  
As the course developers interpret data from the experiences of the students, they must be 
cognizant that strategic thinking must be employed in the evaluative methodology as 
much as it is in the development/revision methodology. The idea of synthesis is important 
in the SLT law enforcement learning organization concept as it is a key innovative step in 
the collaborative process of information sharing. Synthesis of counter-radicalization 
methodology within the learning organization can provide the agencies the ability to 
respond and critically evaluate their own strategies and implement revisions necessary to 
be successful.  
Use of a quantitative and qualitative (mixed methods) survey instrument after the 
first several courses will provide optimal data for the proposed curriculum. The 
quantitative data will most likely provide useful measures of central tendency easily 
obtained from a computer statistical program like the Statistical/Software Package for 
Social Sciences (SPSS). The qualitative data will be interpreted via content analysis. 
Intelligence analysts from the state law enforcement agencies and the fusion centers may 
be the ones who provide the qualitative data that cause substantive curriculum revision in 
future as they will be some of the first personnel to recognize a change in the Islamic 
radicalization threat. 
A second, post-attendance survey will be sent to course participants to find out if 
the curriculum has made any impact upon the local counter-radicalization efforts of the 
student practitioners. Collecting the post-attendance data will steer curriculum revision as 
“best practices” are identified and a learning organization emerges. Lastly, the notion that 
a best practice may be final during its initial application and success phase is false within 
the VUCA environment. A current “best practice” might find itself changed significantly 
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within a month, six months, or a year. In this particular environment, best practices will 
be consider dynamic and fluid in their use. 
2. Cautions  
The Empowering Local Partners (White House, 2011a) and Strategic 
Implementation Plan (White House, 2011c) documents, both focusing on countering al-
Qaida ideology, are dated five years ago, prior to the rise of the Islamic State. The focus 
of this timeframe indicates the dynamic violent Islamic extremism threat as groups 
change, transform, realign, become stronger, and weaker. The threats to the United States 
changes with time and the actors involved. The threat can and will shift from group to 
group, dependent upon the situation. This is another reason that the measurement and 
feedback component of the curriculum project is critical. 
The course facilitators should have skillsets that develop the students’ analytical 
skills. The ability of the students to understand, synthesize, and make applications of 
counter-radicalization strategies for their own jurisdictions will be the major outcome for 
the course. The proposed curriculum for a five-day, 40-hour comparative counter-









Supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting. 
 
—Sun Tzu 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION 
The creation of an asynchronous online discussion forum and curriculum related 
to preventing violent extremism and counter radicalization for law enforcement officers 
and related personnel is a reasonable outcome as data is collected from the overall effort. 
As data would be collected from the participants of the CMC discussion boards, content 
themes will be derived and collected in a manner that allows curriculum developers to 
identify modules of instruction that practitioners deemed critical or worthy in their day-
to-day environment. Although this effort seems tactical and operational in its scope, the 
bigger picture is the strategic concept of a feedback loop. 
Curriculum revision should be a constant process as the VUCA environment 
dictates that strategic thinking and adapting to changing threats are the cornerstone for 
successful operations. Additionally, finding out what curriculum intervention do not work 
(e.g., outright failures or modules deemed ineffective by practitioners) is critical in this 
process. 
Agencies that have successes in the counter-radicalization mission may want to 
participate in a mentoring or exchange program with each other. The selected people 
could serve as leaders in the “best practices” portion of the mission. Grant money may be 
able to be used for this effort via governmental or private funding streams. Consider this 
the “Fulbright” program for counter-radicalization personnel. Funding constraints will 
limit this interventional strategy, but it would be a positive collaborative effort to bring 
thought processes and systematic processes to agencies that may not have the experiential 
component or successful history of interventions. These mentoring/exchange programs 
do not have to be long-term in scope. A three-day to one-week contact will prove 
sufficient in some circumstances to allow for thoughtful dialogue and course changes. 
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Another recommendation is to provide a vehicle to encourage advocate academic 
research (e.g., descriptive or action-research oriented studies) in the area of preventing 
violent extremism. This could lead to creation of a peer-reviewed journal or contribute 
substantially to trade or peer-reviewed journals, such as the Homeland Security Affairs 
Journal, the Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, or the Homeland Defense and Civil 
Support Journal. It would be worth exploring a partnership with an academic institution 
such as the Naval Postgraduate School’s CHDS or the Army War College Homeland 
Defense and Security Issues Group of the Center for Strategic Leadership and 
Development with an established research institutional review board. The latter inclusion 
of academia (with subsequent operational security clearances and/or other accepted 
security provisions) will provide greater chances for expansion of research subject 
material and research efforts. 
This program might serve to augment marketing the pre-existing missions of the 
Naval Postgraduate School’s CHDS Master of Arts Degree Program, Executive Leaders 
Program, and the Fusion Center Leader’s Program. A group of personnel performing the 
counter-radicalization mission might be marketed to as candidates for the three NPS 
programs listed above. This would provide NPS with more candidates for screening and 
review and thusly maintain the quality of the students selected to the programs. 
Subsequently, the Master of Strategic Studies Program at the U.S. Army War College 
may benefit by National Guard and/or U.S. Army Reserve personnel applying to and 
performing research in CVE.  
It is critical to include the buy-in for the learning organizations from major 
stakeholder associations. Examples could include the Naval Postgraduate School’s 
Fusion Center Leadership program graduates, selected Executive Leaders Program 
graduates, the International Association of Chiefs of Police, Fusion Center Leaders 
Program, principal academicians from NPS, and the U.S. Army War College. It is 
important that this collection of practitioners and academics, coupled with the 
collaborative efforts across all levels of the organization, be endorsed by national-level 
organizations that can reliably validate their efforts. The following three 
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recommendations are provided in order to start the SLT LE learning organization and 
begin the process of interaction and curriculum sharing. 
1. Stand up the online asynchronous discussion forum with the first 
phase participants. 
This step begins the process of the SLT LE OAD discussion forum and begins the 
dialogue for the preventing/combating violent extremism for state police departments, 
state bureaus of investigation, and fusion centers. This first phase will begin information 
sharing on their particular CVE mission sets, what has worked in the past, and what has 
not. As the CVE environment is ever-changing, new trends/observations by the state-
level departments will be encouraged for dissemination to the larger group. 
2. Stand up the SLT LE CVE curriculums for continuing education. 
Two specific SLT LE continuing education programs were created in this project. 
The first was to introduce participants to engage within the SLT LE OAD forum. The 
second was designed specifically as an SLT LE continuing education course for those 
officers and ancillary personnel actively engaged in the CVE mission. As soon as the 
SLT LE OAD forum is created, these two LE continuing education course offerings 
should be marketed to target participants. 
3. Course facilitators should begin evaluating feedback on the SLT LE 
OAD as soon as data opportunities present themselves.  
The course facilitators should begin evaluating forum trends and issues as soon as 
data collection will allow. The will allow the facilitators to evaluate the amount of 
information sharing within the OAD, its effectiveness, and trends/issues affecting the 
forum participants. Additionally, the course facilitators will be vigilant for any situations 
that breach agency to agency trust. Lastly, the facilitators will seek opportunities for 




With respect to a proof of concept project, addressing limitations prior to 
implementation are critical to the success of the learning organization. Much of the 
limitations section here derives from the work of D. H. Meadows (2008) Thinking in 
Systems. Meadows offers eight limitations from his research that directly apply to this 
proof of concept project: policy resistance, tragedy of the commons, drift to low 
performance, escalation, success to the successful competition exclusion, shifting the 
burden to the intervener, rule beating, and seeking the wrong goal. Maintaining 
awareness of the eight limitations as described by Meadows (2008) is of critical 
importance to the initiation of the learning organization and its subsequent early success. 
Understanding the limitations will provide strategies for collaboration and initial 
development that will prove fruitful to creating an inclusive and trustful environment.  
1. Policy Resistance  
Meadows (2008) explains that when “various actors try to pull a system stock 
towards various goals, the result can be policy resistance” (Kindle location 2195). This 
would be expected to happen in the creation of the learning organization as law 
enforcement organizations will pull toward their own organizational goals a similar 
manner. Collaborative efforts and establishing trust between the facilitators and law 
enforcement CMC participants needs to be emphasized to mitigate resistance. Moreover, 
initial full disclosure of the learning organization and its goals will be critical as the 
project begins.  
Meadows (2008) indicates the way to ameliorate resistance would be to “let go of 
it, bring in all the actors, and use the energy formerly expended on resistance to seek out 
mutually satisfactory ways for all goals to be realized—or redefinitions of larger and 
more important goals that everyone can pull toward together” (Meadows, 2008, Kindle 
location 2195). Initial assessments (e.g., specific needs assessments for CVE for state law 
enforcement agencies) will be of value here to steer the direction of the CMC as well as 
be responsive to the constituents to be served.  
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2. The Tragedy of the Commons  
Meadows (2008) speaks to the issue of the tragedy of the commons by explaining 
that “with a commonly shared resource, every user benefits directly from its use but 
shares the costs of its abuse with everyone else” (Kindle location 2295). He also indicates 
that the resource (in this case, the learning organization and the CMC) could be overused 
and abused (Meadows, 2008, Kindle location 2295). In the case of the learning 
organization, abuse and overuse could be categorized as distrust issues and not 
participating fully in the CVE mission of discourse via the CMC. Another example would 
be sharing law enforcement CVE failures inappropriately or constantly raiding the CMC 
discussions without bringing new or valuable information.  
3. Drift to Low Performance  
The drift to low performance as described by Meadows as “allowing performance 
standards to be influenced by past performance, especially if there is a negative bias in 
perceiving past performance, sets up a reinforcing feedback loop of eroding goals that 
sets a system drifting towards low performance” (2008, Kindle location 2341). This is a 
very important factor that should be tracked by the facilitators of the CMC program and 
the continuing education augmentations. Negative bias on past performance is an 
important factor to watch for in the SLT law enforcement learning organization as it is a 
new mission for agencies across the country. Any successful attack by extremists would 
be considered a failure in strategy; this perception would likely be exacerbated by the 
media.  
Meadows (2008) explains the solution of the drift to low performance is to keep 
performance standards absolute. He adds, “standards [can] be enhanced by the best 
actual performances instead of being discouraged by the worst” (Meadows, 2008, Kindle 
location 2295). In most organizations, optimal performance from all members is very 
unrealistic. Optimal performance typically comes from a low percentage of participants, 
average performance comes from most participants, and low performance comes from a 
low percentage of participants (as illustrated by a bell curve model). Keeping the learning 
organization from suffering from drift to low performance will be the work of the 
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facilitators and their collaborative interactions. Absolute standards may not be realistic in 
this dynamic environment and should be considered such. 
4. Escalation  
Meadows (2008) explains the escalation phenomena as “when the state of one 
stock is determined by trying to surpass the state of another stock—and vice versa—then 
there is a reinforcing feedback loop carrying the system into an arms race” (Kindle 
location 2398). The facilitators in the learning organization must monitor for this 
phenomenon in all of the organization’s processes. Meadows explains that the way to 
avoid escalation is “to avoid getting in it. If caught in an escalating system, one can 
refuse to compete (unilaterally disarm), thereby interrupting the reinforcing loop. Or one 
can negotiate a new system with balancing loops to control the escalation” (2008, Kindle 
location 2409). A novel idea would be for an independent group to come in periodically 
and evaluate the learning organization process and, more importantly, evaluate realistic 
group/organizational expectations. This is a consideration for the feedback loop 
introduced earlier.  
5. Success to the Successful—Competitive Exclusion  
Meadows eloquently explains success to the successful—competitive exclusion as 
follows, “if the winners of a competition are systematically rewarded with the means to 
win again, a reinforcing feedback loop is created” (2008, Kindle location 2487). The 
CMC process must be constructed to allow success for all involved, no matter the level of 
government, demographic stratification, or law enforcement mission. The reinforcing 
factor here is keeping people safe. As counter-radicalization efforts improve and prove to 
be effective, the reinforcing feedback loop is actualized. Small, local agencies should be 
able to contribute just as the larger agencies when this proof of concept progresses to the 
second phase. Being able to massage the smaller agencies and keep them in the efforts 
will be a substantive challenge to the facilitators as the contributions of every agency will 
contribute to the body of knowledge. Additionally, it bears remembering that the next 
innovative idea may not come from a state law enforcement agency with substantial 
resources, it may come from a smaller local entity.  
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6. Shifting the Burden to the Intervener—Addiction  
The explanation offered by Meadows about shifting the burden to the intervener 
provides an opportunity for interpretation. He explains this limitation as “shifting the 
burden, dependence, and addiction arise when a solution to a systemic problem reduces 
(or disguises) the symptoms, but does nothing to solve the underlying problem” 
(Meadows, 2008, Kindle location 2577). The SLT LE learning organization process must 
be attentive to its original mission of CVE and providing a platform of ideas, successes, 
and failures to the CMC participants at large. Another possible challenge may come from 
future academia participation with respect to not understanding the issue at hand and 
introducing uninformed, or worse, politically motivated discourse that could prove to be 
harmful to the learning organization. The ability to be vigilant to maintain dialogue and 
keep participants on target will be part of the criteria by which facilitators are chosen. 
This strategy goes to the inclusion of academia as well.  
7. Rule Beating  
Meadows explains rule beating as the “rules to be governed a system can lead to 
rule beating—perverse behavior that gives the appearance of obeying the rules or 
achieving the goals, but that actually distorts the system” (2008, Kindle location 2632). 
Peer pressure from the agencies involved may alleviate the problem and assist the 
facilitators in their efforts to observe for violations of situations such as ignoring/skirting 
civil rights processes, ignoring material classification, or breaching organizational trust 
by presenting proprietary material outside of the group. The initial orientation to 
participation in the learning organization should include baseline rules with respect to 
participation and subsequent sharing of information. It is not expected that this event will 
be a major challenge as the mission-centric objective of the learning organization is 
sharing CVE efforts within a CMC project. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
An area for future research would be the feasibility and possibility of creating a 
leaning organization, similar to the one proposed in thesis, for emergency/disaster 
management and emergency medical services. Emergency/disaster management and 
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emergency medical services are fragmented and have many different forms of 
composition and proficiency within the rank and file at the SLT level. Each of these 
professions has similar dynamics and multiple threat variables to the CVE mission. Just 
as the CVE mission, neither profession has created a learning organization to enhance 
mission capability.  
For emergency/disaster management, a learning organization with foundations of 
strategic thinking, scenario planning, and collaboration would be logical places to start. 
Scenario planning would be of particular importance as the “all-hazards” response model 
is the norm for operations. For emergency medical services, investigating various 
methods to facilitate practice-based patient outcomes research would be an avenue to 
explore as it is the evolving trend for the profession. It is logical that collaborative 
methods would be a starting point for that endeavor.  
D. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This type of law enforcement-specific learning organization endeavor as proposed 
in this thesis has not been attempted in this country, nor has it been a major focus of SLT 
stakeholders. If this learning organization endeavor were to move forward, there would 
no doubt be a variety of mistakes made along the way. Those mistakes should not be 
feared as mistakes provide opportunities for learning and improvement. There will be 
dysfunctional information and interpretation, and there will be political considerations to 
manage. However, if focus is placed on the negatives more than the positives, the 
possibility of failure will be high. Myles Horton and Paulo Friere (1991) taught us that 
we make the road by walking. We need to start walking if law enforcement in the United 
States is to prevent violent extremism and meet the counter-radicalization mission. 
Through collaboration and the foundation of strategic thinking, the proof of 
concept model can evolve. Learning will occur at the local level (within the agency) and 
also at the national level (through what is contributed by the local agencies and carried 
forward to the organization itself). The ultimate outcome would be for the law 
enforcement organization to work and then create a similar model for emergency 
 61 
management and emergency medical services, which have similar dynamic/fluid 
environments and complex adaptive systems of their own.  
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APPENDIX A.  INTRODUCTION TO STRATEGIC THINKING AND 
SCENARIO PLANNING FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT CVE 
MISSIONS 
• Introduction and Course Objectives (15 minutes) 
• The Fall of Strategic Planning and the Rise of Strategic Thinking (60 
minutes) 
• Examples of Law Enforcement Applications of Strategic Thinking for the 
Combating Violent Extremism Mission (60 minutes) 
• Introduction to Scenario Planning for Law Enforcement (30 minutes) 
• Building the Toolkit for Law Enforcement Scenario Planning: Creating a 
Framework and Facilitating Discourse for Your Agency (60 minutes) 
• Examples of Law Enforcement Applications of Scenario Planning for the 
Combating Violent Extremism Mission (60 minutes) 
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APPENDIX B.  SYLLABUS FOR COMPARATIVE COUNTER-
RADICALIZATION COURSE 
Day One  Course introduction and distribution of materials 
0800 to 1700 The Scope of the Problem of Radicalization and Violent 
Extremism, an overview of the European Union and the U.S. 
   Introduction to Social Identity Theory 
Overview of Islam—A History of the Religion and the 
Foundations of Radicalization and Violent Extremism  
 
Day Two Discussion of the Current U.S. Counter-Radicalization Policies 
0800 to 1700 Student Presentations of Counter-Radicalization Policies in Their 
Local Jurisdiction (Timed) 
   Introduction to International Comparative Methods 
 
Day Three  Comparative Government and Methods: The United Kingdom 
0800 to 1700  Small Group (Practitioner) Collaboration and Analysis Exercises 
 
Day Four  Comparative Methods: The Netherlands 
0800 to 1700 Small Group (Practitioner) Collaboration and Analysis Exercises 
Workshop for Practitioners to Analyze and Apply Comparative 
Techniques for a Local Counter-Radicalization Problem  
Briefing for Simulations and Role-Play 
 
Day Five  Role Play Exercise #1—Practice 
0800-1700  Role Play Exercise #2—Situation “A” 
   Role Play Exercise #3—Situation “B” 
   Role Play Exercise #4— Situation “C” 
   Exercise and Course Debrief 
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APPENDIX C.  PHASE ONE: LIST OF STATE LAW 
ENFORCEMENT PARTNERS 
Alabama 
 Alabama Department of Public Safety—Highway Patrol Division 
 Alabama Department of Public Safety—Alabama Bureau of Investigation 
 Alabama Fusion Center 
 Alabama Department of Homeland Security 
Alaska 
Alaska State Troopers 
Alaska Bureau of Investigation 
 Alaska Information and Analysis Center  
Arizona 
 Arizona Department of Public Safety—Highway Patrol Division 
 Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center 
Arkansas 
 Arkansas State Police—Highway Patrol Division 
 Arkansas State Fusion Center 
California 
 California Highway Patrol  
 California State Threat Assessment Center 
 Central California Intelligence Center (Sacramento) 
 Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center 
 Northern California Regional Intelligence Center (San Francisco) 
 Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center (Orange County) 
 San Diego Law Enforcement Coordination Center 
Colorado 
 Colorado State Patrol 
Colorado Bureau of Investigation 




 Connecticut State Police 
 Connecticut Bureau of Investigation 
 Connecticut Intelligence Center 
Delaware 
 Delaware State Police 
 Delaware Information and Analysis Center 
Florida 
 Florida Highway Patrol 
 Florida Department of Law Enforcement 
 Florida Fusion Center  
 Central Florida Intelligence Exchange (Orlando) 
 Southeast Florida Fusion Center (Miami) 
Georgia  
 Georgia State Patrol 
 Georgia Bureau of Investigation  
 Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center 
Hawai’i 
 Hawai’i Department of Public Safety—Hawai’i Sheriff’s Office 
 Hawai’i Pacific Regional Information Clearinghouse 
Idaho 
 Idaho State Police 
 Idaho Criminal Intelligence Center 
Illinois 
 Illinois State Police 
 Illinois Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence Center 
 Chicago Crime Prevention and Information Center 
Indiana 
 Indiana State Police 




 Iowa State Patrol 
 Iowa Intelligence Fusion Center 
Kansas 
 Kansas Highway Patrol 
 Kansas Intelligence Fusion Center 
Kentucky 
 Kentucky State Police 
 Kentucky Department of Criminal Investigation 
 Kentucky Intelligence Fusion Center 
Louisiana 
 Louisiana State Police 
 Louisiana State Analytical and Fusion Exchange 
Maine 
 Maine State Police 
 Maine Information and Analysis Center 
Maryland 
 Maryland State Police 
 Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center 
Massachusetts 
 Massachusetts State Police 
 Massachusetts Commonwealth Fusion Center 
 Boston Regional Intelligence Center 
Michigan 
 Michigan State Police 
 Michigan Intelligence Operations Center 
 Detroit and Southeast Michigan Information and Intelligence Center 
Minnesota 
 Minnesota State Patrol 




 Mississippi Highway Patrol 
 Mississippi Analysis and Information Center 
Missouri 
 Missouri State Highway Patrol 
 Missouri Information Analysis Center 
 Kansas City Regional Terrorism Early Warning Interagency Analysis Center 
 St. Louis Terrorism Early Warning Group 
Montana 
 Montana Highway Patrol 
 Montana All-Threat Intelligence Center 
Nebraska 
 Nebraska State Patrol 
 Nebraska Information Analysis Center 
Nevada 
 Nevada Highway Patrol 
 Nevada Threat Analysis Center (Carson City) 
Southern Nevada Counter-Terrorism Center (Las Vegas) 
New Hampshire 
 New Hampshire State Police 
 New Hampshire Information and Analysis Center 
New Jersey 
 New Jersey State Police 
 New Jersey Regional Operations Intelligence Center 
New Mexico 
 New Mexico State Police 
 New Mexico All Source Intelligence Center 
New York 
 New York State Police 
 New York State Intelligence Center 
 
 71 
North Carolina  
 North Carolina State Highway Patrol 
 North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation 
 North Carolina Information Sharing and Analysis Center 
North Dakota 
 North Dakota State Highway Patrol 
 North Dakota State and Local Intelligence Center 
Ohio 
 Ohio State Highway Patrol 
 Ohio Strategic Analysis and Information Center 
 Cincinnati/Hamilton County Regional Terrorism Early Warning Group 
 Northeast Ohio Regional Fusion Center (Cleveland) 
Oklahoma 
 Oklahoma Department of Public Safety - Oklahoma Highway Patrol 
 Oklahoma Information Fusion Center 
Oregon  
 Oregon State Police 
 Oregon Terrorism Information Threat Assessment Network 
Pennsylvania 
 Pennsylvania State Police 
 Pennsylvania Criminal Intelligence Center 
 Delaware Valley Intelligence Center (Philadelphia) 
 Southwestern Pennsylvania Region 13 Fusion Center (Pittsburgh) 
Rhode Island 
 Rhode Island State Police 
 Rhode Island State Fusion Center 
South Carolina 
 South Carolina Highway Patrol 
 South Carolina Law Enforcement Division 
 South Carolina Information and Intelligence Center  
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South Dakota  
 South Dakota Department of Public Safety—Highway Patrol 
 South Dakota Fusion Center 
Tennessee 
 Tennessee Highway Patrol 
 Tennessee Bureau of Investigation 
 Tennessee Fusion Center 
 Tennessee Office of Homeland Security 
Texas 
 Texas Department of Public Safety—Highway Patrol Division 
 Texas Fusion Center 
 Houston Regional Intelligence Service Center 
 North Central Texas Fusion Center (McKinney) 
Utah 
 Utah Department of Public Safety—Utah Highway Patrol 
 Utah Statewide Information and Analysis Center 
Vermont  
 Vermont State Police 
 Vermont Fusion Center 
Virginia 
 Virginia State Police 
 Bureau of Criminal Investigation—Virginia State Police 
 Virginia Fusion Center 
 Northern Virginia Regional Intelligence Center (Fairfax) 
Washington 
 Washington State Patrol 
 Investigative Services Bureau—Washington State Patrol 
 Washington State Fusion Center 




Washington, District of Columbia 
 DC Metro Police Department 
 Washington Regional Threat and Analysis Center 
West Virginia 
 West Virginia State Police 
 West Virginia Intelligence Fusion Center 
 West Virginia Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 
Wisconsin 
 Wisconsin State Patrol 
 Wisconsin Department of Justice—Division of Criminal Investigation 
 Wisconsin Statewide Information Center 
 Southeastern Wisconsin Threat Analysis Center (Milwaukee) 
 Wisconsin State Homeland Security 
Wyoming 
 Wyoming Highway Patrol 
 Wyoming Division of Criminal Investigation 
 Wyoming Fusion Center 
 Wyoming Office of Homeland Security 
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APPENDIX D.  PHASE TWO: LIST OF MUNICIPAL AND COUNTY 
LAW ENFORCEMENT PARTNERS 
Alabama 
 Birmingham Police Department 
Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office  
Montgomery Police Department 
Alaska 
 Anchorage Police Department 
Arizona 
 Phoenix Police Department 
 Tucson Police Department 
 Mesa Police Department 
 Glendale Police Department 
 Scottsdale Police Department 
 Chandler Police Department 
 Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office 
 Pima County Sheriff’s Department 
Arkansas 
 Little Rock Police Department 
California 
 Los Angeles Police Department 
 Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department 
 San Diego Police Department 
 San Diego County Sheriff’s Department 
 San Jose Police Department  
 San Francisco Police Department 
 Long Beach Police Department 
 Fresno Police Department 
 Fresno County Sheriff’s Department 
 Sacramento Police Department 
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 Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department 
Oakland Police Department 
 Santa Ana Police Department 
 Anaheim Police Department 
 Riverside Police Department 
 Riverside County Sheriff’s Department 
 Stockton Police Department 
 Bakersfield Police Department 
 Modesto Police Department 
 Fremont Police Department 
 Glendale Police Department 
 Chula Vista Police Department 
 Orange County Sheriff’s Department 
 Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department 
 Santa Clara County Sheriff’s Department 
 Alameda County Sheriff’s Department 
 Contra Costa County Sheriff’s Department 
 Kern County Sheriff’s Department 
 Ventura County Sheriff’s Department 
 San Francisco County Sheriff’s Department 
 San Mateo County Sheriff’s Department 
 San Joaquin County Sheriff’s Department 
Colorado 
 Denver Police Department 
 Colorado Springs Police Department 
 Aurora Police Department 
 El Paso County Sheriff’s Department 
Connecticut 
 Bridgeport Police Department 
Delaware 




 Jacksonville Police Department 
 Duval County Sheriff’s Department 
 Miami Police Department 
 Metro Dade County Police Department 
 Tampa Police Department 
 Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Department 
 St. Petersburg Police Department 
 Pinellas County Sheriff’s Department  
 Hialeah Police Department 
 Orlando Police Department 
 Orange County Sheriff’s Department 
 Broward County Sheriff’s Department 
 Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Department 
Georgia  
 Atlanta Police Department 
 Fulton County Police Department 
 Gwinnett County Police Department 
 DeKalb County Police Department 
 Cobb County Police Department 
Hawai’i 
 Honolulu Police Department 
Idaho 
 Boise Police Department 
Illinois 
 Chicago Police Department 
 Cook County Police Department 
Indiana 
 Indianapolis Police Department 
 Fort Wayne Police Department 
Iowa 
 Des Moines Police Department 
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Kansas 
 Wichita Police Department 
Kentucky 
 Lexington—Fayette County Division of Police 
 Louisville Metro Police Department 
 Jefferson County Sheriff’s Department 
Louisiana 
 New Orleans Police Department 
 Baton Rouge Police Department 
 Shreveport Police Department 
Maine 
 Portland Police Department 
Maryland 
 Baltimore Police Department 
 Baltimore County Police Department 
 Montgomery County Police Department 
 Prince George’s County Police Department 
 Baltimore City Police Department 
Massachusetts 
 Boston Police Department 
 Cambridge Police Department 
 Lowell Police Department 
 Springfield Police Department  
 Worchester Police Department 
Michigan 
 Detroit Police Department 
 Wayne County Sheriff’s Department 
 Oakland County Sheriff’s Department 
 Macomb County Sheriff’s Department 
Minnesota 
 Minneapolis Police Department 
 79 
 Hennepin County Sheriff’s Department 
 St. Paul Police Department 
Mississippi 
 Jackson Police Department 
Missouri 
 Kansas City Police Department 
 St. Louis Police Department 
 St. Louis County Police Department 
 Jackson County Sheriff’s Department 
Montana 
 Billings Police Department 
Nebraska 
 Omaha Police Department 
 Lincoln Police Department 
Nevada 
 Las Vegas Metro Police Department 
 Henderson Police Department 
New Hampshire 
 Manchester Police Department 
New Jersey 
 Newark Police Department 
 Jersey City Police Department 
 Bergen County Police Department 
 Essex County Sheriff’s Department 
 Hudson County Sheriff’s Department 
New Mexico 
 Albuquerque Police Department 
 Bernalillo County Sheriff’s Department 
New York 
 Buffalo Police Department 
 Erie County Central Police Services 
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 Monroe County Sheriff’s Department 
 Nassau County Police Department 
 New York City Police Department 
 Rochester Police Department 
 Suffolk County Police Department 
 Westchester County Department of Public Safety 
 Yonkers Police Department 
North Carolina  
 Charlotte- Mecklenburg Police Department  
 Raleigh Police Department  
 Wake County Sheriff’s Department 
 Greensboro Police Department 
 Durham Police Department 
North Dakota 
 Fargo Police Department 
Ohio 
 Columbus Police Department 
 Cuyahoga County Sheriff’s Department 
 Franklin County Sheriff’s Department 
 Hamilton County Sheriff’s Department 
 Cleveland Police Department 
 Cincinnati Police Department 
 Toledo Police Department 
 Akron Police Department 
Oklahoma 
 Oklahoma City Police Department 
 Oklahoma County Sheriff’s Department 
 Tulsa Police Department 
Oregon  
 Portland Police Department 




 Philadelphia Police Department 
 Pittsburgh Police Department 
 Allegheny County Police Department 
 Montgomery County Sheriff’s Department 
Rhode Island 
 Providence Police Department 
South Carolina 
 Columbia Police Department 
South Dakota  
 Sioux Falls Police Department 
Tennessee 
 Memphis Police Department 
 Nashville-Davidson County Metro Police Department 
 Shelby County Sheriff’s Department 
Texas 
 Houston Police Department 
 Harris County Sheriff’s Department 
 San Antonio Police Department 
 Dallas Police Department 
 Dallas County Sheriff’s Department 
Austin Police Department 
 Fort Worth Police Department 
 Tarrant County Sheriff’s Department 
 El Paso Police Department 
 El Paso County Sheriff’s Department 
 Arlington Police Department 
 Corpus Christi Police Department 
 Plano Police Department 
 Garland Police Department 
 Lubbock Police Department 
 Laredo Police Department 
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 Bexar County Sheriff’s Department 
 Travis County Sheriff’s Department 
 Collin County Sheriff’s Department 
 Hidalgo County Sheriff’s Department 
 Denton County Sheriff’s Department 
Utah 
 Salt Lake City, Utah 
 Salt Lake Unified Police Department 
Vermont  
 Burlington Police Department 
Virginia 
 Virginia Beach Police Department 
 Norfolk Police Department 
 Chesapeake Police Department 
 Fairfax County Police Department 
Washington 
 Seattle Police Department 
 King County Sheriff’s Department 
 Pierce County Sheriff’s Department 
 Snohomish County Sheriff’s Department 
 Tacoma Police Department 
West Virginia 
 Charleston Police Department 
Wisconsin 
 Milwaukee Police Department 
 Madison Police Department 
 Milwaukee County Sheriff’s Office 
Wyoming 
 Cheyenne Police Department 
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